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SUMMARY
Weaknesses in planning and implementation (P&I) have been identified as one of the main reasons
for the disappointing results of agricultural water development and management projects. Based
on a review and critical analysis of experiences and case studies in sub-Saharan Africa, this study
component proposes practical ways of improving performance related to planning and implementation
and thereby enhancing the returns to investments in agricultural water.
P&I is analyzed within the overall context of the project life cycle, broken down into the
following six phases: (i) Identification; (ii) Preparation; (iii) Appraisal; (iv) Negotiation and Approval;
(v) Implementation and Supervision; and (vi) Evaluation. Weaknesses reported at the different stages
of this cycle are identified and analyzed. A comprehensive desk review of 18 selected projects
funded by the World Bank and African Development Bank, covering 11 countries in West, East
and Central Africa, and detailed case studies of 19 projects in 5 countries, are supplemented by
the P&I lessons learnt from another 5 case studies of IFAD-supported projects in Kenya, Tanzania,
Madagascar and Zimbabwe carried out under the Poverty Reduction component of the Collaborative
Program. In addition, staff of several development agencies (including ADB, IFAD, AFD, FAO)
were interviewed. The sample of projects analyzed is therefore broadly representative of agricultural
water development and management experiences in sub-Saharan Africa. This summary presents
the major findings and key recommendations emerging from the study.
Major findings
Similarities and differences among different international financing institutions (IFIs): Overall,
financing agencies follow similar project cycles with some variation in terms of the emphasis and
actors involved at different stages. For example, IFAD’s approach tends to be more participatory
compared to the World Bank and African Development Bank. With respect to the project cycle,
governments take the lead in project identification; few IFIs take an active part at this stage. Insofar
as project preparation is concerned, the official position is for the borrower to drive the process
with the financing institution providing support as needed. But in practice this phase is led by financing
agency staff, assisted by their consultants (although some IFIs provide assistance to the borrower
through special loans or grants, or solicit borrower inputs through stakeholder workshops and
consultations). IFIs’ approaches to project appraisal and negotiations are very similar. All IFIs
consider project supervision as a critical task and provide for periodic formal progress reviews
during the project life, with a project completion report produced at the end of the implementation
period. Finally, ex-post evaluation is carried out systematically for all World Bank projects, but other
IFIs do this more selectively; in all cases, this is performed by specialized departments of the
financing agencies, separate from those responsible for operations and implementation.
Overview of P&I weaknesses: The contribution of the project to the realization of relevant sectoral
strategies, national policy goals and more recently poverty reduction strategies has not always been
explicitly spelt out.  This often results in a lack of fit between the project planning process and the
general policy dialogue between government and IFIs and ultimately, weak buy-in on the part of
the latter, and difficulties for governments to satisfy their own commitments. Although the impactx
of sound project preparation and appraisal on project performance is recognized, particularly by
IFIs, it does not seem to get the attention it deserves in practice. For example, design choices that
do not take into account actual on-the-ground operational and management capabilities can seriously
compromise outcomes. The arrangements for overall project implementation and supervision are
by far the major determinants for project success. Key constraints are: limited technical and
managerial capacities within government and executing agencies, lack of incentives to attract and
retain skilled staff, inadequate monitoring, inappropriate supervision by IFIs (with over-emphasis
on physical achievements and disbursements at the expense of development effectiveness), and
difficulties coping with institutional changes such as decentralization, irrigation management transfer,
and greater private sector participation. Finally, explicit mechanisms (and resources) to evaluate
project impacts such as on poverty reduction are rarely in place with the result that there is no
real opportunity to learn from project experiences and feed into a country’s knowledge base of
P&I of agricultural water projects.
IFIs’ responsibilities in P&I failures: Shifts in IFIs’ funding priorities sometimes lead to
inconsistency with government strategies, particularly in the case of bilateral financial institutions
(which are strongly influenced by the political orientation of the financing country). However,
multilateral agencies are also blamed by national partners for their complex and lengthy disbursement
procedures and strict conditionalities. On the other hand, financing agencies also appear to be
operating under a lot of pressure — staff not only have large portfolios of responsibility but are
also expected to have sound knowledge of the agency’s procedures, be skilled in project management
and their own area of disciplinary competence, as well as be able to integrate crosscutting issues
such as gender, HIV/AIDS, and the environment, among others. This situation has an adverse
effect on IFI involvement in critical phases of the project cycle and ultimately on project performance
and outcomes. Furthermore, internal communication and sharing of experiences within and among
different departments of financing agencies are deemed to be poor, hampering development of
institutional memory and capacity. The fragmentation of, for example, water projects among different
departments of IFIs mirrors the fragmentation among government departments, and hinders their
capacity to take an integrated approach consistent with the principles of Integrated Water Resources
Management (IWRM). In view of the trend towards decentralization of authority to local
government levels, IFIs also need to focus more seriously on supporting capacity building at these
levels to support this decentralization trend.
Government responsibilities in P&I failures: Government responsibility ranges from the
commitment of financial and human resources to assuming ownership and responsibility for project
performance. Falling short in any of these areas – inability to respect counterpart contributions,
inadequate staff skills, poor support services to beneficiaries, non-transparent procedures for
procurement and recruitment of personnel — seriously compromises outcomes. This predicament
is not made easier by the different IFIs procedures and rules, and the trend towards decentralization
to local levels, where the shortage of skills and resources is even worse than at national level.
Responsibilities of executing agencies in P&I failures: It is not always easy to assemble and
retain the complex mix of technical, social, economic and management skills required for an effective
project management team, especially in light of the limited human and financial resource base of
many countries in SSA. In the absence of incentives such as a reasonable salary and working
conditions, it is a huge challenge to retain the requisite skills and build continuity and national capacity
in project management. On the other hand, early establishment of a project management unitxi
adapted to the local context enhances chances of successful project implementation, although there
is debate about the desirable degree of autonomy of a PMU: whether the governmental executing
agency should use its own staff for the PMU, or hire staff especially for the task with the risk of
their abandoning the project before completion.
Recommendations
Two overarching recommendations emerge from this study.  The first is that project management
should not be viewed as an “overhead” to be minimized, but an essential feature of successful
projects, with potentially huge pay-offs. It requires the deployment of adequate human and financial
resources and is applicable at IFIs as well as government and partner levels.
The second overarching recommendation is that projects must be considered as learning and
capacity building opportunities that will contribute to a knowledge base on planning and
implementation of agricultural water projects (costs, technical options, standards/norms, policies,
institutional arrangements for service provision, inventory of expertise …), strengthening the
institutional memory of governments and IFIs, and ultimately creating an environment that
encourages and enables better quality investments.























   
 
 













Les résultats décevants des projets d’aménagement et de gestion hydro-agricoles ont été attribués
principalement aux faiblesses de la planification et de la mise en oeuvre des projets. Basée sur
une revue et une analyse critique d’expériences et de cas d’étude en Afrique sub-saharienne, ce
rapport propose des voies pratiques pour améliorer les performances liées à la planification et à la
mise en œuvre des projets  afin d’accroître la rentabilité des investissements hydro-agricoles.
La planification et la mise en oeuvre sont analysées dans le contexte général du cycle de projet,
décomposé en six phases : (i) Identification; (ii) Préparation; (iii) Evaluation préalable; (iv)
Négociation et Approbation; (v) Mise en œuvre et Supervision; et (vi) Evaluation a posteriori. Les
faiblesses relatives aux différentes étapes de ce cycle  sont identifiées et analysées. Une revue
détaillée d’une sélection de 18 projets financés par la Banque Mondiale et la Banque Africaine de
Développement, couvrant 11 pays en Afrique de l’Ouest, de l’Est et Centrale et des études de cas
détaillées de 19 projets dans 5 pays sont complétées par les leçons tirées de 5 autres cas d’étude
de projets financés par le FIDA au Kenya, en Tanzanie, à Madagascar et au Zimbabwe, et conduits
dans le cadre de la composante sur la Réduction de la Pauvreté du Programme de Collaboration.
De plus, des personnels de plusieurs agences de développement (BAD, FIDA, AFD, FAO) ont
été interviewés. L’échantillon de projets analysés est donc  d’une manière générale représentatif
des expériences d’aménagement et de gestion hydro-agricoles en Afrique sub-Saharienne. Ce
résumé présente les principaux enseignements et les recommandations clés qui se dégagent de
cette étude.
Principaux enseignements
Similarités et différences entre les différents bailleurs de fonds : Dans l’ensemble, les bailleurs
de fonds suivent des cycles de projets similaires, avec quelques variantes concernant l’importance
relative de chaque étape et les acteurs qui y sont impliqués. L’approche du FIDA, par exemple,
tend à être plus participative, comparée à celles de la Banque Mondiale et de la Banque Africaine
de Développement. En ce qui concerne le cycle du projet, les gouvernements ont l’initiative dans
la phase d’identification, alors que peu de bailleurs de fonds s’impliquent à ce stade. Pendant la
phase de préparation, la position officielle est que l’emprunteur conduit le processus avec si
nécessaire l’aide du bailleur de fond. Mais en pratique cette phase est conduite par le personnel
des institutions financières internationales ou leurs consultants (bien que certains bailleurs de fonds
fournissent une aide aux emprunteurs sous forme de prêts ou de subventions, ou sollicitent la
participation des emprunteurs au travers d’ateliers ou de consultations des parties prenantes). Les
approches des bailleurs au cours des phases d’évaluation et de négociation du projet sont très
similaires. Toutes les institutions financières internationales considèrent la supervision du projet
comme une tâche cruciale et prévoient des rapports d’avancement tout au long du projet, avec un
rapport final à la fin de la période de mise en œuvre. Pour finir, une évaluation ex-post est conduite
systématiquement pour tous les projets de la Banque Mondiale, mais d’autres bailleurs de fonds
n’y ont recours que ponctuellement. Dans tous les cas, ces évaluations sont conduites par des
services spécialisés des agences financières, différents de ceux qui sont en charge de la mise en
œuvre et de la gestion des projets.xvi
Vue d’ensemble des faiblesses de la planification et de la mise en œuvre : La contribution des
projets à la réalisation des objectifs des politiques nationales,  des stratégies sectorielles pertinentes,
et plus récemment des stratégies de réduction de la pauvreté,  n’est pas toujours démontrée de
façon explicite. Il en résulte souvent une inadéquation entre le processus de planification des projets
et le dialogue général sur les politiques entre le gouvernement et les bailleurs de fonds, avec pour
conséquence un manque d’engagement de la part des bailleurs et des difficultés pour les
gouvernements à assumer leurs propres  responsabilités. Bien que l’intérêt d’une solide préparation
du projet et de l’évaluation de ses performances soit reconnu, en particulier par les institutions
financières internationales, cette phase ne semble pas recueillir dans la pratique toute l’attention
qu’elle mérite. Par exemple, une conception qui ne tient pas compte des capacités réelles
d’exploitation et de gestion sur le terrain peut compromettre fortement les résultats du projet. Les
arrangements concernant la mise en œuvre et la supervision sont de loin les déterminants majeurs
de la réussite du projet. Les principales contraintes à ce stade comprennent des compétences
techniques et d’encadrement limitées au sein du gouvernement et des agences d’exécution, le
manque de mesures incitatives pour attirer et fidéliser un personnel qualifié, un suivi sur le terrain
et une supervision inadaptés de la part des institutions financières internationales (avec trop
d’importance accordée aux réalisations physiques et aux décaissements au détriment de l’efficacité
du développement), et des difficultés à faire face à des changements institutionnels tels que la
décentralisation, le transfert de gestion de l’irrigation et la participation accrue du secteur privé.
Enfin, les mécanismes explicites (et les ressources) permettant d’évaluer les impacts des projets,
par exemple sur la réduction de la pauvreté, sont rarement en place, ceci limitant les possibilités
réelles d’apprentissage à partir des expériences de projets et de constitution de bases de
connaissances sur la planification et la mise en œuvre des projets hydro-agricoles.
Les responsabilités des institutions financières internationales dans les échecs de la
planification et de la mise en œuvre : Des changements dans les priorités de financement des
bailleurs de fonds amènent parfois à des incohérences avec les stratégies des gouvernements,
particulièrement dans le cas des institutions financières bilatérales (qui sont fortement influencées
par l’orientation politique du pays bailleur). Toutefois, les agences multilatérales sont aussi montrées
du doigt par les partenaires nationaux en raison de la complexité et de la lenteur de leurs procédures
de décaissement et de la rigueur de leurs conditions d’octroi des financements. D’un autre côté,
les agences financières opèrent sous une forte pression – leurs employés ont non seulement un
large éventail de responsabilités mais sont également supposés avoir une connaissance approfondie
des procédures de l’agence, être qualifiés dans leur propre discipline et dans la gestion de projets,
et être capables d’intégrer des questions transversales telles que le genre, le VIH/SIDA et
l’environnement, entre autres. Cette situation a un effet négatif sur l’implication des bailleurs de
fonds dans les phases critiques du cycle du projet et finalement sur les performances et les résultats
des projets. De plus, la communication interne et le partage d’expériences au sein de et entre les
différents services des agences financières sont connus pour leur faiblesse, ce qui gène le
développement des capacités et la constitution d’une mémoire institutionnelle. La fragmentation
des projets hydrauliques par exemple entre différents départements des institutions financières
internationales reflète la fragmentation entre les départements ministériels au niveau des pays, et
limite leur capacité à adopter une approche intégrée cohérente avec les principes de la Gestion
Intégrée des Ressources en Eau (GIRE). Etant donnée la tendance à la décentralisation de l’autorité
vers les niveaux locaux de gouvernement, les institutions financières internationales doivent aussi
renforcer sérieusement leur soutien au développement des capacités à ces niveaux pour appuyer
ce mouvement de  décentralisation.xvii
Les responsabilités des gouvernements dans les échecs de la planification et de la mise en
œuvre : La responsabilité des gouvernements va de l’engagement des ressources financières et
humaines à l’appropriation et à l’endossement de la responsabilité des performances du projet. Un
manquement dans quelque domaine que se soit – incapacité à respecter sa contribution financière,
personnel insuffisamment qualifié, insuffisance des services d’aide aux bénéficiaires, manque de
transparence dans les procédures d’approvisionnement et de recrutement du personnel – peut
compromettre sérieusement les résultats des projets. Cette situation est rendue plus difficile encore
par la diversité des règles et des procédures des différents bailleurs de fonds et par la tendance à
la décentralisation vers les niveaux locaux, où le manque de ressources et de qualification est encore
pire qu’au niveau national.
Les responsabilités des agences d’exécution dans les échecs de la planification et de la mise
en œuvre : Il n’est pas toujours facile de rassembler et de maintenir la combinaison complexe de
compétences techniques, sociales, économiques et d’encadrement requise pour former une équipe
de gestion de projet efficace. Ceci est d’autant plus vrai si l’on considère les ressources humaines
et financières limitées de beaucoup de pays d’Afrique sub-saharienne. En l’absence d’incitations
telles qu’un salaire raisonnable et de bonnes conditions de travail, c’est un énorme challenge que
de conserver les compétences et de maintenir la continuité et la capacité nationale de gestion des
projets dans le pays. A l’opposé, la mise en place, très tôt, d’une équipe de gestion de projet adaptée
au contexte local accroît les chances de réussite du projet. Il y a cependant débat à propos de
l’autonomie de cette équipe de gestion de projet : l’agence gouvernementale d’exécution doit-elle
employer son propre personnel pour la constituer ou recruter des personnes spécialement pour
cette tâche, au risque de les voir partir avant l’achèvement du projet ?
Recommandations
Deux recommandations générales émergent de cette étude. La première est que la gestion de
projet ne doit pas être considérée comme une charge, que l’on doit chercher à réduire, mais comme
une caractéristique essentielle à la réussite des projets, génératrice de bénéfices potentiellement
très importants. Elle nécessite de ce fait la mobilisation de ressources humaines et financières
adaptées et concerne à la fois les institutions financières internationales, les gouvernements et leurs
partenaires.
La seconde recommandation générale est que les projets doivent être considérés comme des
opportunités de création de savoirs et de renforcement des compétences qui contribueront à une
base de connaissances sur la planification et la mise en œuvre des projets hydro-agricoles (coûts,
options techniques, standards et normes, politiques, arrangements institutionnels pour la fourniture
de services, inventaire des capacités d’expertise,…) , renforçant la mémoire institutionnelle des
gouvernements et des bailleurs de fonds, et créant finalement un environnement qui encourage et
facilite l’accroissement d’investissements de meilleure qualité.
D’autres recommandations plus spécifiques aux projets d’aménagements hydro-agricoles sont







































1 Disappointing results of agricultural water development efforts in the past have often been
associated with poor planning, appraisal and implementation of investment opportunities in
Asia as well as Africa (Nijman, 1991; 1992). Failures in design and implementation of
projects have often caused low or even negative returns on investment, emergence of
environmental and health problems, lack of sustainability, subsequent collapse of
infrastructure, and emergence of a rehabilitation – lack of maintenance – rehabilitation
cycle. Even where project design has been satisfactory, weak implementation capacity
has often led to unsatisfactory results.
2 Many projects in the past (not only agricultural projects) were designed and implemented
in a top-down fashion, with little or no real participation of the supposed ‘beneficiaries’ in
designing and implementing projects. Investments have often been driven by International
Financing Institutions (IFIs) and governments, and not by the demands and wishes of
potential beneficiaries. Even projects specifically intended to enhance farmers’ capacity
for scheme management have often not succeeded, in part because of serious project design
and implementation weaknesses (Shah et al. 2002).
3 The main challenge in the sector is to create the environment for increased and sustainable
agricultural production through efficient management of the existing irrigated lands and expansion
into new areas, to improve food security and livelihoods. This requires development planning
and mobilization of investment resources for implementation and operation of many projects
over the coming decades. Weaknesses in the planning and implementation process had been
identified at the Harare workshop initiating the Collaborative Program and in other forums as
one of the key issues that should be addressed to facilitate increased development in the sector.
This is the justification for this component study.
2 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE
4 The specific objective of the Planning and Implementation component is to identify ways
to increase the performance and sustainability of investments in agricultural water, by
pinpointing practical measures to improve project preparation and implementation. This
includes planning, appraisal, implementation arrangements, supervision (or ‘implementation
support’), and systems for monitoring and evaluation. Special attention has been paid to
the institutional framework for project planning, appraisal and implementation, in terms of
the incentives the different parties may have with respect to achieving the project goals.
Ways to make projects more demand-driven, such that the water users are motivated and
enabled to use the infrastructure productively and sustainably have been emphasized. This
component focuses on agricultural water use projects funded by multilateral IFIs (World
Bank, African Development Bank, International Fund for Agricultural Development,
European Union). A few projects funded by bilateral agencies (Agence Française de
Développement), governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Care, World
Vision) and private sector were incorporated in the analysis. The study covers both large-
scale and small-scale schemes.2
1For more details, refer to Morardet et al. (2004 a and b).
2For a precise definition of the terms “relevance”, “efficacy”, “efficiency”, see for instance World Bank, 1996.
5 The study comprised two phases: a desk review, and a field study based on a limited set
of country cases. The purpose of the desk study was to review and classify the different
causes of success and failure of agricultural water development projects that had already
been identified and the solutions proposed to remedy these problems. The case studies
were intended to fill gaps in information and provide the basis for deeper insights. They
focused on recently implemented, not necessarily completed, projects, to assess to what
extent the new trends in IFIs’ policies and procedures are implemented on the ground, to
identify the constraints faced and innovative ways of overcoming them. This report
integrates and synthesizes the findings of the two phases1.
3 METHODOLOGY
3.1 Conceptual framework
6 Planning and implementation problems are often cited to explain the differences between
objectives and achievements in agricultural water use projects in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Moreover it is assumed that most of the technical failures have an institutional origin. Criteria
used to judge these projects refer to their relevance and their efficacy. The efficacy of
projects relates to how the results compare to the objectives, i.e., were the things done in
the right way. The relevance of projects refers to how a set of objectives is defined, i.e.,
were the right things done2. These objectives are then compared to the national development
plans and strategies. The idea is therefore to explain how planning and implementation
processes may have an impact on the relevance and efficacy of the projects.
7 Planning and implementation problems have already been well documented in many studies,
with several contributions dating from the early 1990s (see for example Diemer and Vincent
1992). Nevertheless, the ranking of importance among the possible causes of these
problems varies from one expert to another. Further, it is currently difficult to assess to
what extent the problems diagnosed in the early 1990s still apply today.
8 In a broad way, many of the problematic issues exposed in the early 1990s have been
integrated in new policy frameworks: participation of beneficiaries in the design, attention
to gender and the poorer segments of the population, design of user associations to take
over the operation and maintenance after project completion, relationships between the
project management unit (PMU) and governmental agencies, etc. While these elements
are now part of the official discourse and thus more or less compulsorily present in project
appraisal documents, more recent projects still show disappointing results vis-à-vis these
issues.3
9 Therefore, it may be useful to assess to what extent the planning and implementation
processes have really evolved by comparing projects implemented at different periods within
the last twenty years. An assessment of some on-going projects may demonstrate what
progress has been made, and may also identify a new set of issues.
10 The various failures reported in the literature may occur at different stages of the planning
and implementation process. Therefore, the proposed conceptual framework is based on
a description of the project life cycle, and on the identification of the different types of
failures associated with each stage.
11 The effectiveness of each stage is closely linked to the stakeholders involved in
implementation and to the way the responsibilities are shared among them. Therefore it is
important to clearly identify for each stage its requirements, the institution in charge, the
expected outputs, and the potential means of monitoring its execution.
12 The institutional failures can be divided into three types:
 A lack of capacity of one or more of the actors regarding one or more of the actions
(planning, supervision, implementation, etc);
 A lack of incentives to complete successfully the expected actions; and
 A problem within the project lifecycle.
13 There are also often perceived trade-offs between the benefits of an improvement of the
institutional process and their costs, but there is evidence to the contrary.
14 For a specific project, the failures or successes at each stage of the project life cycle can
be identified by answering the following questions:
 What are the incentives of the various actors involved in the project (e.g., the investor,
government officials, politicians, contractors, the presumed ‘beneficiaries’)? Are project
objectives and the incentive structures aligned and consistent? Who are the losers and
who are the winners? How do these affect the project outcomes?
 What is the quality of data used in planning, implementation, and monitoring? How
effectively are these data used?  Do all parties to the project have access to the data
they need?  How do these issues affect project outcomes?
 How effective are the mechanisms for project management? Do all the key actors
have a voice? Is there an effective, transparent planning and monitoring process? Does
the project have the support from the government, investors, and beneficiaries it requires
for effective implementation? Are the decision-making, tendering, financial disbursement,
etc. mechanisms effective, transparent, and consistent with best practice? How do these
factors affect project outcomes?4
 How is the project design and implementation affected by government policies and
capacities? Is the project consistent with government policies? Is the capacity of the
implementing agency adequate for project implementation as agreed? If not, what is
being done to ensure capacity is built? Is the project designed in a way to capture lessons
that may be relevant for improving government policies? How do these factors affect
project outcomes?
15 Other issues to be at least partially addressed include the following:
 Application of IWRM principles and treatment of agricultural water within the
framework of holistic, integrated river basin management and integrated rural
development approach or lack of it3;
 Suitability of physical design and choice of technology to the local situation; suitability
of scale and complexity of project to local capacities and conditions; and
 Strategy for capacity building, awareness and widening the knowledge base including
public education; professional services and construction; research and technology
adaptation.
16 This component of the Collaborative Program has compiled experiences of countries and
the collaborating partners from past and recent project preparation and implementation,
and analyzed lessons learned to identify key constraints and innovative approaches to enable
increased investment in the sector. The methodology is, broadly, an “institutional analysis,”
drawing from sociology and institutional economics but focusing on identifying practical
implementable suggestions for improvement without indulging in a broad theoretical critique
of project design.
17 The study has analyzed the institutional and technical settings wherein projects are
conceptualized, developed and implemented and eventually operated. The idea is to
understand how these setting have contributed to a project’s success or failure.
3.2 Material and method
18 The desk review analyzed past experiences and approaches of financing institutions and
countries to identify possible reasons for successes or failures, based on a review of
academic and gray literature (a comprehensive list of the references used is provided in
Morardet et al., 2004a). Documents from three financing institutions, World Bank (WB),
African Development Bank (ADB) and International Fund for Agricultural Development
(IFAD) have been analyzed: policies and guidelines, reviews of project performance, and
crosscutting evaluations.
3Uncritical implementation of inappropriate policies in the name of “IWRM” is also an issue; see Van Koppen and Safilios-
Rothschild 2005.5
19 The desk review also included 18 selected projects funded by the World Bank (12 projects)
and ADB (6 projects), started from 1977 to 1994, and completed from 1984 to 2000. The
classification of projects according IFIs, regions and period of completion is given in Table
1 (a comprehensive list can be found in Morardet et al. 2004a). This sample shows a good
representation of West, Central and East African projects but it comprises no project from
Southern Africa. Besides, there is clearly an imbalance between French-speaking and
English-speaking countries in favor of the former, which balances biases of previous studies
towards Anglophone countries.
20 Most of the projects in this sample are large or medium scale schemes; only two projects
concern small-scale irrigation schemes (WB Nigeria 1999, WB Mauritania 1993). Most
of the schemes use surface water, with only two projects using groundwater (WB Nigeria
1999). Rice is the only crop in 12 projects and the major crop in 3 projects, with only 3
projects without rice (WB Sudan 1995; ADB Ethiopia 1984; ADB Chad 1999). There is
an overall balance between new development and rehabilitation projects and between pump
and gravity irrigation. Only project completion reports have been studied except for two
projects (ADB Ethiopia 1984, ADB Niger 1989), for which we reviewed performance
audit reports.
21 Five countries were selected to conduct field case studies: Mali, Nigeria, Ethiopia,
Madagascar and Zambia. A consultant (or team of consultants) was appointed in each
country to conduct a three-part study: (1) a review of available irrigation literature in the
country in the context of its agriculture sector and where available, information on irrigation
project planning and implementation from relevant agencies;  (2) lessons from key
informants interviews, and (3) analyses of several case projects, with a special focus on
small-scale schemes to balance the bias of the first sample towards large scale perimeters.
Table 1. Distribution of reviewed projects according to IFI, sub-region and completion period.
NB: Projects are labelled by their financing institution, country and year of completion.
Period of completion
Region 1984-89 1990-94 1995-2000
West Africa WB Niger 1984 WB Niger 1992 WB Senegal 1995
ADB Niger 1989 WB Mali 1992 (2 projects) WB Nigeria 1999
WB Mauritania 1993
WB Burkina Faso 1996
Central Africa ADB Chad 1999
East Africa ADB Ethiopia 1984 WB Madagascar 1991 and 1993 WB Madagascar 2000
ADB Madagascar 1994 ADB Madagascar 1995
ADB Tanzania 1993 WB Sudan 19956
22 The key informants included:
(1) various government agencies — departments of agriculture/environment and irrigation
agencies and project implementing units, as well as planning departments;
(2) local and foreign contractors/consultants involved in irrigation projects;
(3) representatives of main multilateral and bilateral financing institutions in irrigation sector;
(4) national research institutes; and
(5) NGOs implementing irrigation projects.
23 Key informants were interviewed on their views, based on experience, of the planning
and implementation process of irrigation projects. Proposed improvements or “solutions”
to past failures or successful experiences were also gathered from them4.
24 Specific project cases were analyzed on the basis of available project documents (pre-
feasibility studies, preparation report, appraisal report, supervision reports, completion and
evaluation reports, mission reports) complemented by key informants’ shared information
and knowledge, and interviews of stakeholders involved in project planning and
implementation at local level (project implementation unit, beneficiaries). Table 2 lists the
projects analyzed in each of the five countries. In a final phase, lessons were also drawn
from case studies analyzed within the Study on Agricultural Water Development and
Poverty Reduction in Eastern and Southern Africa (under the Collaborative Program) (see
Table 3 for a list a case studies used for the present component).
25 Combining the three sets of projects (desk review, P&I case studies, poverty reduction
case studies), the sample analyzed in this report is broadly representative of experiences
in SSA, even if its size does not allow statistical analysis.
26 Desk reviews and case studies were complemented by interviews of staff of different
funding agencies or Cooperating Institutions (ADB, IFAD, Agence Française de
Développement, FAO Investment Center). Finally, participation in the Regional Water
Management and Irrigation Workshop – Eastern and Southern Africa, organized by IFAD
in Mwanza (Tanzania) in March 2005 provided an opportunity to meet IFAD representatives
and managers of IFAD-assisted projects.
27 Differences among the IFIs’ systems and processes in designing and implementing projects
were documented using internal and public documents from WB, ADB and IFAD. The
qualitative analysis of the different causes of both successes and failures for the whole
project cycle was based on examples found in academic and gray literature and on the
analysis of the project samples. The proposed recommendations derive from the analysis
of literature and the three samples of agricultural water development projects. Both factors
4As discussions were not systematically held with consultants and contractors in all our country case studies, there is no
specific section in this report on the interviews outcomes. More details are given in each country case study report.7
Table 3: List of case studies analyzed from the “Study on Agricultural Water Development
and Poverty Reduction in Eastern and Southern Africa”5
Country Project Funding agency
Kenya Rural Enterprises Agribusiness Promotion Project (REAP) IFAD
Tanzania Mara Region Farmers’ Initiative Project (MaraFIP) IFAD
Tanzania Participatory Irrigation Development Program (PIDP) IFAD
Madagascar Upper Mandrare Development Project IFAD
Zimbabwe Dombolidenje dam and irrigation scheme IFAD
(sub-project of Smallholder Dry Areas
Resource Management Project - SDARMP)
5Other case studies were analyzed as part of the Study on Agricultural Water Development and Poverty Reduction in
Eastern and Southern Africa. However the case studies mentioned in this table are the only ones used for the present
report on P&I processes.  See Peacock (2005).
of success and failure and recommendations were classified from two points of view: the
phase of the project cycle in which they occur or apply, and the main actors concerned.
In the following sections, a reference to a country without mentioning the name of the
project means a reference to the general conclusion of the country case study.
Table 2: List of projects analyzed during country case studies.
Country Project Funding agency
Mali Pilot Private Irrigation Promotion Project World Bank
Maninkoura Irrigation Scheme ADB
Zone lacustre Development Project Phase II IFAD
Valorisation des Ressources en Eau de Surface European Union
Nigeria National Fadama Development Project (Fadama I) World Bank
Second National Fadama Development Project, (Fadama II) World Bank and ADB
Ethiopia Sheled project (IFAD Special Country Program Phases I & II) IFAD
Weyu Seriti Pump scheme and Dodicha Pump irrigation World Bank through ESRDF(*)
Bato Degaga pump irrigation World Vision Ethiopia
Doni Kombe gravity irrigation scheme CARE
Godino Rehabilitation and Expansion SSI Ethiopian government
Wakie Teyo small pumps Private/farmers initiated
Madagascar Projet de réhabilitation des petits périmètres irrigués phase 1 World Bank, European Union and AFD
Second irrigation rehabilitation project World Bank
Projet de réhabilitation du périmètre de bas Mangoki ADB
Projet de mise en valeur  et de protection des bassins AFD
   versants du Lac Alaotra
Zambia Small-scale Irrigation Project ADB
The Kaleya outgrowers scheme Smallholders scheme supported
by Zambia Sugar company
Smallholder Irrigation and Water Use Program IFAD
(*) ESRDF: Ethiopian Social Rehabilitation and Development Fund.8
4 SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS
28 The first section describes the project life cycle, considered as the basic organization of
the planning and implementation of development projects, in particular in agricultural water
management6. Similarities and differences among three funding agencies, WB, ADB and
IFAD, are highlighted. The second section presents the general failures of planning and
implementation processes which are not specific to agricultural water management projects,
classified according the phases in which the problems occur.  Problems more specifically
related to agricultural water investments are then discussed separately. Responsibilities of
the different actors in the process are presented in the fourth section. Finally, current trends
in P&I processes are placed in the context of the new development assistance framework.
4.1 The project life cycle: Comparison of planning and implementation processes
among different funding agencies
29 The following description of the project cycle in the World Bank, African Development
Bank and IFAD is based on documents supplied by the three organizations, complemented
for ADB and IFAD by interviews of operational staff involved in the different phases of
the project life cycle. Table 4 below presents the actors involved at different phases of
the project cycle, respectively.
30 It appears that the three funding agencies have more or less the same phasing of the project
cycle, which can be divided into 6 phases7.
i. Identification largely relies on proposals prepared by governments and submitted to
the three funding agencies. The example of Madagascar, however, shows that some
financing institutions (AFD, EDF) take a more important role in identification (see Table
5), based on their previous interventions in the country. The formal inclusion of a project
in the project pipeline, which is the responsibility of IFI operational staff, depends on
the consistency of the project with the IFI’s policies, the country development strategy
(CAS, CSP or COSOP) and finally on the level of preparation of the proposal. If
necessary, sector or project identification missions are undertaken to collect additional
data and interact with the borrower.
ii. The purpose of the preparation phase, which may take up to 3 years, is to draw up
the detailed design of the project. The official position of the three funding agencies is
to encourage the borrower to drive the process, the Bank/Fund’s staff providing only
support as requested8, in order to preserve the sense of ownership by the borrower.
Nevertheless, in practice, financiers largely drive the process – mainly because the
6This description is derived from the funding agencies’ most recent documents, therefore real processes may differ from
those presented here, as policies and guidelines are not always applied.
7The project cycle described here is not specific to agricultural water investments projects.
8Unlike what is claimed in ADB and WB documents, past agricultural water development projects seem to have often been
driven by donors.9
borrower usually does not take the initiative, or does not have the technical and financial
capacity to do so. Consequently, many projects are prepared/designed by consultants
employed by the Bank/Fund or by the FAO Investment Centre with Cooperative
Programme funds (see example of Madagascar in Table 5). However, IFAD, for
example, does make an attempt at getting the borrower involved through using national
consultants or government staff on preparation missions – and of course through
stakeholder workshops and briefing/wrap-up meetings9. The minimum task of the IFI
staff is to ensure that all the information needed for appraisal are gathered. Nevertheless,
the necessity of an active role of the financing institution in the preparation is recognized
to ensure the quality at entry. The Special Programme for Food Security funded by
FAO was cited in the Mali case study as an example where an early interaction
between financing institutions and beneficiaries helped to build a better understanding
of the local situation and mutual confidence, with beneficial impacts on implementation
(Keita, 2004). Based on documents, IFAD staff members seem to take a more important
part in preparation than in the case of the other financing institutions, though this may
not be the case on the ground (Tony Peacock, personal communication). In all cases,
the importance of a participatory approach is stressed in the procedure documents,
though it is not clear to what extent participation is really implemented. To help
borrowers to prepare sound proposals, WB and ADB may provide special loans or
grants for technical assistance and engineering (Project Preparation Facility in WB,
Technical Assistance Fund, Project Preparation Fund or bilateral funds managed by
the Bank in ADB, cooperative programs with UN agencies for both). Support for
preparation can also come from bilateral financing institution grants. Because of the
variety of factors that are involved, this phase is probably the least formalized of the
whole project cycle, but also the most demanding in terms of time and resources.
iii. The project can be appraised once the financing institution and the government have
agreed on the details of the project. The appraisal involves a comprehensive and
systematic review of all the aspects of the project, with a view to preparing the ground
for the financing institution’s Board of Directors’ decision. In all cases, this phase is
the responsibility of the financing institution and conducted by its staff and/or consultants.
The appraisal, which comprises a field mission and desk review of work done in
previous phases, covers different aspects: technical (sound design, appropriate
engineering and technology), institutional (implementing organization, management and
staff, conditions of operations of this institution, need for technical assistance), economic
(contribution to the country development objectives, cost-benefit analysis, risk analysis)
and financial (cost estimates, availability of funds to cover implementation costs, risk
of non-payment of the loan). Crosscutting issues such as poverty, gender, participation
and environment are also examined. In all institutions, the appraisal report is subject
to a formal review process before submission to the Board of Directors.
9For example, PIDP was prepared by FAO/IC on behalf of government of Tanzania. During the preparation phase a series
of workshops was held in various centers throughout the large project area, attended by a wide range of stakeholders,
including farmers, NGOs and so on. Government staff participated fully in appraisal (Tony Peacock, personal
communication).10
iv. Negotiation and approval: After the financing institution’s staff has completed the
project appraisal report, the IFI and the borrower negotiate the terms and conditions
of the loan agreement (conditions of effectiveness of the loan, conditions of
disbursement and withdrawal procedures, interest rate and currency…). The project
(appraisal report and loan agreement) is then submitted to the IFI’s Board of Directors
for final approval and to the government for ratification by the relevant institution
(council of ministers or legislature). This ratification is a standard condition of
effectiveness of the loan. Once signed by both parties’ representatives and all conditions
are fulfilled, the loan is declared effective. This agreement sets a deadline for the last
disbursement, depending on the nature of the project and the planned length of the
implementation period.
v. Implementation and supervision: In all cases, implementation is the responsibility of
the borrowing country, which generally sets up a Project Management Unit in charge
of operational management. In the WB and ADB, the financing institution is responsible
for supervision; IFAD delegates this task to Cooperating Institutions (CIs)10 (IFAD,
Table 4: Actors involved at each stage of the project cycle according to funding agency.
Sources: World Bank Project Cycle (website); IFAD project cycle (website); IFAD (2002 and 2003); ADB Group (1999);
ADB and IFAD staff interviews.
Phases of World Bank African Development IFAD
Project Cycle Bank
Identification Bank Task Managers and ADB Country Operations IFAD Country
borrower Department and/or Sector Portfolio Managers
Department (CPMs)
Preparation Borrower with support from Borrower with support Borrower and beneficiaries
the Bank Task Managers from ADB Sector
(consultants) Departments (consultants)
Appraisal Bank’s operational staff ADB’s operational staff IFAD CPMs and review
(consultants) (consultants) committees
Negotiation Bank and borrower Bank and borrower IFAD and borrower
Approval Bank’s Board of Executive Bank’s Board of Directors IFAD Executive Board
Directors
Implementation Borrower, implementing Borrower, implementing Borrower, implementing
agency/PMU, (consultants) agency/PMU, (consultants) agency/PMU(consultants)
beneficiaries beneficiaries NGOs, CBOs, beneficiaries
Supervision Bank’s operational staff ADB’s operational staff Cooperating Institutions /
(consultants) (consultants) IFAD (consultants)
Completion Bank’s operational staff ADB’s operational staff IFAD operational staff (CPMs)
Ex post Bank’s Operations Evaluation Operations Evaluation 1) Office of Evaluation (OED)
Evaluation Department (OED) Department (OPEV) (consultants) for the
evaluation report
2) OED, stakeholders for the
agreement at completion report
10The Agreement establishing IFAD states that the Fund shall delegate the administration of its loans and the supervision
of its projects to “competent international institutions”, generally called Cooperating Institutions. Common CIs are World
Bank, regional development banks or United Nations Office for Projects Services (UNOPS). CIs can also perform pre-
investment activities (e.g., project identification, preparation and appraisal) on behalf of the Fund.11
Table 5: Comparison of P&I approaches of various financing institutions in Madagascar
Project phase Process Advantages Drawbacks
Identification by IFI, following their Rapidity of Lack of ownership
previous intervention identification from Magalasy
(AFD and EDF projects) government
by government (WB, Better ownership Lengthy process (3-4 years)
ADB, and IFAD from
projects) government
by IFI and government Rapid process Low capacity of adaptation
in second phase projects Good ownership to new orientation, persistence
of bad practices inheritated
from previous project
Preparation always WB PPI 1 and 2 No beneficiaries participation,
led by IFIs and done by: (nationwide) foreign consultants
- FAO-IC for WB,
ADB and IFAD-
funded  projects
- international consultants ADB PRBM and IFAD Beneficiaries’
for AFD and EDF PHBM (localised) participation
funded projects
Appraisal EDF, AFD, WB:
responsibility and
authority of  the IFI
ADB, IFAD:
particpatory approach
Implementation and PPI funded by WB, Strengthening of Hierarchical organisation,
supervision EDF, AFD: governmental centralisation, less
implementation by agencies, participation,
existing government knowledge lack of horizontal
agencies capitalisation collaboration, lack of
external control
ADB and IFAD Better efficiency, No capitalisation of
projects: independant more flexibility, knowledge after completion,
PMU supervision by lack of ownership from
administration governmental institutions
Source: synthesized from Rajoelison (2004). This table reflects the perception of stakeholders interviewed during the
case study.
2003). Implementation comprises different tasks: procurement of goods and services,
loan administration, contract management, supervision of the construction of physical
components, monitoring and reporting, facilitation and training, institutional building, etc.
Monitoring and reporting is an important part of the activities of the Project Management
Unit in the borrowing country and the basis of the supervision by the financing
institution’s staff.12
The three financing institutions consider project supervision as one of their most important
activities. Its purposes are to ensure the achievements of project objectives in conformity
with the loan agreement, to identify problems quickly and to help the borrower resolve
them, to cancel the project if necessary, to disseminate significant lessons to the IFI’s staff,
management and Board, to prepare completion reports, and to use the experience gained
to improve the design of future projects, strategies and policies. The supervision is a
combination of desk review (progress reports prepared by the borrower, supervision of
procurement and disbursement, maintenance of project records, actions to resolve problems)
and field visits to resolve specific problems and obtain direct information. ADB’s stated
policy is to give adequate priority to supervision in the allocation of staff time and other
resources. It also recognizes the necessity for flexibility in the timing and frequency of
supervision missions according to the nature and complexity of the project. Following a
1996 review of supervision in the projects it financed, IFAD undertook a five year action
plan (1997-2001) to improve the effectiveness of the supervision in order to enhance the
quality of project implementation.
All the three financing institutions have implemented a mid-term review as part of their
supervision process. Supervision of individual projects is complemented by regular country
or sector portfolio reviews that summarize the difficulties encountered during implementation
of projects in a country or a sector.
At the end of the implementation period (up to 10 years), a project completion report is
prepared identifying accomplishments, problems encountered and lessons learned. This
report is submitted to the Board of Directors for information. As a self-evaluation document,
the completion report is the last step of the supervision, but it also prepares for the following
phase of evaluation. This report makes use of all the data available from the borrower,
the executing agency, consultants and supervisory staff. For ADB and IFAD-assisted
projects, the borrower should prepare its own completion report, which is supplied to the
Bank/Fund’s staff prior to their completion mission. The World Bank asks borrowers
comment on its Office of Evaluation Department (OED) report11 and to prepare their own
completion report.
vi. Evaluation: In the three funding agencies, project evaluation is carried on by an
independent department (OED in WB, OPEV in ADB, OE in IFAD). Since 1970, ex
post evaluation is a requirement for all WB projects. The evaluation comprises three
stages: (i) an audit of the outcomes of the project against its original objectives is
prepared just after completion, (ii) a Project Performance Assessment Report rating
project outcomes, sustainability of results and the institutional development impact, is
prepared for one out of four completed projects; (iii) an Impact Evaluation Report
assessing the economic worth of the project and its long-term effects on people and
the environment, is performed 5 to 8 years after completion. In ADB, the Project
Evaluation Reports are prepared upon request, but not for all projects. They are generally
done two or three years after project completion. In IFAD, the evaluation team
comprising consultants recruited by OE under the supervision of a lead evaluator
11Prepared alongside the project completion report submitted by operational staff.13
prepares the evaluation report. OE, relevant IFAD officials and other stakeholders
develop an Agreement at Completion Point stating how they propose to translate into
actions the recommendations issued in the evaluation report. All the three agencies have
developed sets of criteria for evaluation in order to facilitate the comparison of evaluation
results across countries and sectors.
31 As illustrated in Table 4 and Table 6, the project cycle of the three agencies presents many
similarities. The main difference is the nature of actors involved in the process and the
distribution of roles among actors: in WB and ADB, the process is fairly centralized with
little involvement of the Banks in the identification and preparation phases; the particularities
of the IFAD’s process compared to the other two financing institutions are the importance
attached to the participation of all stakeholders, including the beneficiaries, from identification
to evaluation, and the delegation of supervision to Cooperative Institutions. Differences in
the designation of project documents (Table 6) reveal disparities in format and requirements
that may increase the burden of borrowing countries, especially for projects co-funded by
several financing institutions, as it was stressed during case studies.
4.2 General failures in P&I processes
32 The different sources of information used in this study show a broad convergence regarding
the reasons for poor performance of agricultural water development projects, and illustrate
their extreme diversity. A first classification of these failures according to the stage of the
project life cycle in which they occur is provided in Annex 1.  The Annex associates each
technical failure identified with the underlying institutional problem, indicates papers that
documented it and gives examples of projects in which this problem occurred. From this
first analysis, one must acknowledge that many of institutional failures related to planning
and implementation that affect agricultural water management projects are not specific to
this sector12. These general planning and implementation problems are summarized in Table
7. The issues specific to agricultural water management projects are addressed in the next
section.
33 Neither the literature, nor the evaluation or project documents make many references to
problems that occur at identification stage13; most of the flaws at this stage have been
reported by key informants interviewed during the case studies. ADB operational staff
acknowledge that identification is a lower priority since it falls under the borrower’s
responsibility with little financing institution intervention. Generally speaking identification
remains poorly documented.
12Many of the failures described below are also pointed out by a review of 75 ADB funded projects in various sectors,
completed from 1979 to 1997 (ADB/ADF/OED 2002).
13For example a WB review of irrigation projects in 1995 stated “irrigation evaluations provide no insights into the
quality of project identification” (Jones 1995).14
34 On the contrary, failures occurring in the preparation and implementation phases are well
documented in the literature, project documents and case studies. The impact of the quality
of preparation and appraisal on project outcomes has been demonstrated by Jones (1995)
in the case of World Bank irrigation projects. Case studies and documents of projects funded
by other financing institutions (ADB Chad 200014; ADB Ethiopia 198415 IFAD Tanzania
14Impact on salinity of the irrigation scheme not properly addressed during preparation.
15Poor technical design of the canal leading to high sedimentation.
Phases of Project Cycle Documents or reports produced
World Bank ADB IFAD
Policy dialogue Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
Country Assistance Country Strategy Country Strategy
Strategy (CAS)  Paper (CSP) Opportunities (COSOP)
Identification Project Concept Note, Identification Report Project Inception
(or inception) Project Information Paper (PIP)
Document
Preparation Environmental Preparation Report Specific studies, final






Appraisal Project Appraisal Appraisal Report Project Appraisal
Document Report
Negotiation and Loan/Financing Loan/Financing Loan/Financing
Approval Agreement Agreement  Agreement
Implementation and Supervision reports Supervision reports Supervision reports
Supervision Interim evaluation Interim evaluation Mid term review lessons
Completion Implementation Project Completion Completion Report
Completion Report Report (PCR)
(ICR)
Ex post Evaluation Project Performance Performance Evaluation 1) Evaluation Report
Assessment Report, Report (PER) 2) Agreement at
Impact Evaluation Report, Completion Point
Inspection Panel Report
Sources: World Bank Project Cycle (website); IFAD project cycle (website); IFAD (2002); ADB Group (1999); ADB staff
interviews.
Table 6: Documents produced at different phases of the project cycle by funding agencies.15
MaraFIP16; IFAD Zimbabwe Dombolidenje dam17 18) give additional examples of this
relationship. In our case studies the most often cited problems are lack of participation of
beneficiaries in identification and design (all countries) and inadequacy of environmental
studies (Nigeria, Madagascar19). However, although IFI task managers consider project
preparation as the most sensitive phase, evaluators reckon that it is still not given enough
attention (ADB/ADF/OED 2002; ADB/ADF/OED 1999) and, in a number of cases, the
quality of preparation studies can be questioned. Preparation presents particular difficulties
in the case of projects consisting of several small-scale irrigation schemes (which is current
in IFAD-funded projects, for example). Because of the relatively small amount of investment
in each sub-project, their technical feasibility and financial viability are sometimes not
seriously analyzed.
35 The overall project organization (or implementation arrangements) plays a key role in
implementation. The main problems recorded are related to the number and complexity of
components, the number of actors involved in the process20, the quality of their relationships,
the clarity of roles and responsibilities assigned to each of them21, and their accountability.
Communication difficulties are reported in several case studies (Zambia, Madagascar), but
examples of successful organizations also exist (Tanzania PIDP, Madagascar Upper
Mandrare). In projects composed of several sub-projects (e.g., IFAD-funded projects),
problems are compounded by the increased levels of decision necessary for selection of
sub-projects and disbursements (e.g.,  Dombolidenje case study in Zimbabwe, where the
dilution of responsibilities along the 5 levels in the selection process led to the selection of
an irrigation scheme that should not have been approved).
36 Even a carefully prepared project may demonstrate poor performance if not properly
implemented. For example, the Ethiopian case study reported that some aspects of the
study process are undertaken simply to comply with funding agencies’ requirements, but
once the project is appraised and approved, there is often limited follow up during
implementation and post-implementation. The main issues at this stage are therefore the
flexibility in project design and the quality assurance process (see Box 1 for further
discussion). Again, case studies and project documents reviewed in this study give abundant
examples of implementation problems (see Table 7 and details in the Annex and in next
sections). Most of the difficulties can be explained by three major problems: lack of means
and technical and managerial capacities at country level (cited in Nigeria and Madagascar
16Technical design funded on insufficient knowledge of local agricultural practices.
17No financial viability assessment was prepared.
18In the two latter cases, the problems arose because of poor preparation and appraisal of the subprojects during the
project implementation.
19On the latter, see also the synthesis report of the Environment and Health component of the Collaborative Program
(McCartney et al., 2005).
20For example, the high number of organizations involved at federal and state levels in the Fadama Project in Nigeria is
one of the main reasons for the problems observed in this project.
21This can be made difficult if structural changes are taking place in concerned ministerial departments during project
implementation (e.g., Ethiopian case study).16
case studies)22; inadequate monitoring and evaluation system set up by the borrower and
its executing agencies (cited in Madagascar case study); and inappropriate supervision
provided by financing institutions. These issues are addressed in more detail in the next
sections.
37 Flaws in the evaluation process are mostly reported by meta-evaluations (i.e., evaluation
of the evaluation process) commissioned by financial institutions, and have not been
identified during case studies. Almost all case studies report difficulties experienced by
farmers after project completion in accessing markets for inputs (Ethiopia, Mali, Zambia)
and outputs (Nigeria, Zambia), getting adequate information and extension support in
agricultural production (Ethiopia), and sustainably managing the schemes (Ethiopia, Mali,
Madagascar, Nigeria). According to cases, these difficulties can be explained either by
poor preparation or failing implementation or both.
38 It has proven difficult to establish a hierarchy among the different causes of failures
identified, partly because the sample of projects we reviewed was too small to allow a
statistical analysis, partly because of the subjective nature of this type of analysis. A review
of the World Bank’s experience in irrigation covering all the regions of the world (Jones
1995) shows how operational staff and evaluators rated the different factors of success
and failure of irrigation projects (see Box 2 for a list of categories of problems): both
categories of staff consider that irrigation design and effectiveness of bank preparation
and appraisal are the main factors of success/failure of a project. They also both consider
that agricultural issues and drainage design are not the main problems. But they disagree
on the importance of project implementation and basic data availability (rated higher by
operational staff than by evaluators), and outside project factors, (more important for
evaluators than for operational staff)23.  As far as we know, there was no equivalent work
done recently on irrigation in Sub-Saharan Africa, and it was not possible to perform the
same kind of survey given the limited scope of this study.
4.3 P&I issues specific to irrigation projects
39 Although it was not possible to perform a quantitative analysis of P&I failures, interviews
of ADB staff, discussions at the IFAD workshop in Mwanza and an e-conference in 2003,
as well as case studies provide some insights into the main problems specifically related
to water development projects.
22This can be compounded by the lack of standard and effective P&I guidelines, as expressed in the Ethiopian case study.
23These differences are apparently more related to the stage of project cycle at which each category intervenes and to the
role they play, than to their professional background.17
Table 7: Main failures of project planning and implementation process along the project
cycle.
Phase Failures of P&I processes
Identification - Lower priority given by financing institutions
- Country Strategy papers not sufficiently detailed, poor communication between
departments of financing institutions
- No continuity in priorities and funding from financing institutions
- Inconsistencies between financing institutions’ priorities and government strategies
- Absence or inadequacy of reference to similar projects
Preparation and - Poor quality of available data (environmental, economic, social, health)
appraisal - Lack of time and skills dedicated to pre-evaluation studies
- Lack of early involvement of actors responsible for implementation
(in particular poor participation of beneficiaries)
- Poor understanding of national and regional contexts of project implementation
in terms of environmental conditions, financial and managerial capacities and
livelihood strategies of rural households
- Environmental and health impacts not taken into consideration
- Targeting of beneficiaries
Implementation and - Release of project funds delayed because not in phase with government budgetary
supervision cycle
- Lack of technical and managerial capacities of government and executing agencies in
loan management, procurement and contract management,
- Lack of incentives from governments to attract and keep skilled and trained staff
(because of insufficient means and awareness)
- Poor participation and capacity building of various actors (farmers, agricultural service
providers, WUAs…)
- Inadequate or non-existent monitoring and evaluation system (poor capacities of
project staff and/or insufficient preparation) and poor communication among the
various actors
- Insufficient and inadequate supervision from financing institutions: lack of time,
composition of supervision mission, general bias towards physical achievements
and disbursements at the expense of development effectiveness; insufficient technical
supervision
- Difficult management of institutional changes (decentralization, irrigation management
transfer, privatization) and weak political will
- Political interference in implementation decisions
Completion and - No real measurement of project impact on rural poverty
evaluation - Quality of information available related to M&E systems
- Insufficient time and skills dedicated to evaluation
After completion - Inadequate support to farmers in terms of extension services, access to inputs,
credit and agricultural markets
- Difficulties in O&M linked to poor design, inadequate or insufficient capacity
building, weakness of private service providers, or insufficient funds
Source: synthesis of literature review and analysis of project documents (see Annex for details). Country irrigation
strategy.18
Box 1: Project design and flexibility during implementation: A quality assurance
issue.
Regarding project design and flexibility during implementation, two schools of thought can
schematically be opposed:
 For the first, the implementers should, if they wish, be able to change any activities
and organization arrangements as long as they respect the ‘Overall Objectives’ and
‘Project Purpose’;
 For the other, the project log frame and Appraisal Report are the basis of the Loan
Agreement and must be adhered to whatever the circumstances – or at least until
the Mid-Term Review (MTR) confirms that design modifications are necessary.
Obviously, there is room for alternative approaches within these two extremes. However, a
laissez faire approach may be extremely dangerous for the following reasons:
 irrigation projects are almost always complex;
 consequently considerable multidisciplinary analytical and design expertise has to be
employed in formulation and appraisal missions – and this expertise is provided mainly
by external specialists (bank staff, consultants, FAO Investment Centre), because
local capacity is too weak to do so; and
 when random design changes are made during implementation, decision-makers do
not have access to such expertise (either from within the project or from external
assistance) and, therefore, bearing in mind the complexity of irrigation projects, such
changes bring a high risk of compromising project objectives.
Saying that, a rigid compliance with the Appraisal Report is also not desirable. Project staff
members often develop very valid design alternatives – and they should be encouraged to
do so – even before an MTR. The question is whether adequate mechanisms for approvals
are in place. In many cases, even when design changes have the blessing of the financing
institution’s management, there is still a quality assurance gap, because the financing
institution’s management itself may not have the skills to judge the full implications of its
approvals.
So far, no universal solution has been suggested. One option might be to refer all proposed
design changes to the Project Development Team in funding agencies – with specific
technical support when necessary. The use of framework consultants could be an alternative.
(Tony Peacock, personal communication)19
Box 2: Classification of irrigation implementation problems perceived by operation
and evaluation departments in World Bank (from Jones, 1995).
In 1992, World Bank staff members involved in irrigation project management or evaluation
were asked to identify their perception of problem areas in irrigation. In a series of brainstorming
sessions, 129 categories of problems encountered in irrigation were identified, and then grouped
into the 16 following categories:
1. basic data availability 10. agricultural technical support
2. planning and resource assessment (after operations)
3. irrigation system design 11. agricultural production factors
4. drainage system design 12. processing marketing and transport
5. agricultural support design 13. cost recovery, taxation, regulations and benefits
6. other project elements 14. effectiveness of preparation and appraisal
7. project implementation by the financing institution
8. system water operations 15. outside project factors
9. system maintenance 16. other factors not in above categories
4.3.1 Country irrigation strategy
40 Two main categories of goals can be identified in the sample of projects we studied24: 1)
almost all the projects, completed in all periods, aim at increasing staple food production,
increasing rural household income and improving food security at local and national levels;
2) about one third of the sample has an additional goal of building institutions to manage
irrigation schemes in a sustainable way, and is the sole objective in only two cases. Only
two projects, among the most recent, mention explicitly reduction of poverty. This trend is
confirmed by the preliminary findings from an OED study on agricultural water management
World Bank-supported projects started between 1994 and 2004: “only about one third
have explicit poverty focus in objectives” (OED, 2005 – see also Abdel-Dayem, 2005).
The linkages between the project objectives and either the national agricultural strategy or
the strategy of the financing institution regarding the sector or the country are not strongly
emphasized in PCRs and PPARs25. Previous experience of the financing institution in the
country is not always even cited26. These facts may be interpreted as a relatively poor
integration of the project planning process within the general policy dialogue between
financing institutions and borrowers, as well as, possibly, a weak buy-in by financing
institution staff in charge of project preparation.
24This paragraph refers only to ADB and WB assisted projects, of which PCR or PPAR content was analyzed, not to
IFAD–assisted projects.
25The national agricultural development policy is referred to in almost all projects we analyzed, sometimes extensively,
sometimes very briefly, but an irrigation strategy is never mentioned. The lending strategy of the Bank is mentioned in
only three cases (all funded by WB).
26It might be done in appraisal reports but we did not have access to these documents.20
Figure 1. Linkages between water resources management, policy, strategy and legislation in
Ethiopia (source: Gessesse and Natea, 2004).
41 However, as illustrated in our case studies, since the mid-1990s some governments, possibly
under the pressure of financing institutions, have designed national irrigation strategies that
integrate the objectives and orientations of different sectoral policies (rural development,
agriculture, environment…) and general policies (macro-economic policy, poverty reduction
strategy, decentralization…).
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show examples of Ethiopia’s irrigation development policy and Mali’s
National Strategy of Irrigation Development. Common features of these new political trends
comprise: state withdrawal of irrigation management and promotion of private sector
investments, decentralization of planning, increased involvement of rural populations in
planning and management of irrigation schemes, and greater attention given to environmental
impacts and sustainable management of water resources. In many cases, the impacts of
these relatively recent policies on P&I processes are still difficult to perceive.
42 In our interviews of ADB staff, surprisingly, issues such as the scope of projects (water
development versus integrated agricultural development versus integrated rural
development), scale of irrigation schemes (large scale / small scale / individual technologies),
purpose of irrigation investments (staple crops for food self-sufficiency / high value crops
for export) were not touched on. These issues were addressed during the e-conference
organized by the World Bank in 2003, and partially during the IFAD workshop in Mwanza
in March 2004, but without clear-cut conclusions. The case studies give some insights on
some of these topics. Regarding the purpose of irrigation, our analysis of the “Poverty21
Figure 2: Relations between macro-economic policy, poverty reduction strategy, sector policies
and irrigation strategy in Mali (source: Keita, 2004).
Case Studies” suggests that even when the project aims at reducing poverty, the need for
cost effectiveness and higher productivity of agricultural production should still be a major
concern – but it is not always clear whether this is the case (see also Van Koppen et al.,
2005). FAO Technical Investment Centre staff we interviewed shared this view. From
the case studies, it appears that although small-scale irrigation schemes – which does not
necessarily mean small investment projects – may facilitate the participation of farmers,
they can also experience implementation failures and poor performance, because it is more
difficult to focus the necessary but scarce skills on small schemes, especially if they are
not included in a bigger program, as it the case of some schemes developed by NGOs
(Ethiopia, Zambia)27. Technical design may be neglected and economic analysis may be
very superficial. In cases where small subprojects are embedded into a bigger program
(as in IFAD-funded projects), the multiplicity of decision levels often increases the risk of
implementation problems.
27The cost study addresses this issue; see Inocencio et al. 2005: Large investment projects to develop large numbers of
small irrigation schemes tend to show lower costs and better performance than for example small investment projects.22
4.3.2 Targetting beneficiaries
43 WB and ADB projects we studied never mention criteria for targeting the beneficiaries of
the projects: it is assumed that once the site of the project is selected, all the rural households
in the area will benefit. Even when poverty alleviation is specifically mentioned as a project
goal, there is rarely an explicit or implicit poverty reduction impact assessment (e.g., Fadama
I Project in Nigeria - Omilola, 2004; see Van Koppen et al., 2005). Moreover, among recent
projects funded by the World Bank, there is a “widespread assumption that since most
households are poor no poverty targeting is needed” (OED, 2005). Appraisal documents
generally show a weak analysis of who are poor and why, although non-dedicated
agricultural management projects (e.g., integrated rural development projects, community-
driven development projects) usually perform better from this point of view. In cases where
a specific targeted population is specified (e.g., IFAD-supported projects), the PMU does
not know how to proceed in practice, and the better-off farmers are more likely to be
selected because they have better access to information and can more easily contribute
to the labor and/or capital costs (e.g., Dombolidenje scheme in Zimbabwe). Poor women-
headed households are from this perspective very difficult to reach (Kenya REAP, Tanzania
MaraFIP, Tanzania PIDP, Madagascar Upper Mandrare). The report on the poverty
component of this study provides further insights on this topic (van Koppen et al., 2005).
4.3.3 Phasing and timing of irrigation projects
44 Some ADB staff suggested phasing irrigation projects (construct the core infrastructure
to harness water sources, and then develop the command area) as a way to simplify project
implementation, thereby minimizing delays and lack of appropriate implementing staff
capacity and to ensure ‘manageability’ of projects. The gap between project length and
what is necessary to really implement a scheme and make it functioning was also
underlined. ADB and AFD staff and some key informants interviewed during the case
studies feel that financing institutions’ support stops too early after the achievement of the
physical components.
4.3.4 Crosscutting issues to consider at preparation
45 Crosscutting issues, such as environment (water resources, drainage, aquifer and catchment
management), gender, land tenure, and agricultural support services, are considered as very
important by the operational staff we interviewed (see also Jones, 1995), and not always
well addressed in past projects. They mention some improvements, but they acknowledge
that it is still difficult to really implement the recommendations in these domains. This is
also confirmed by the health and environment component study (McCartney et al., 2005).
Two areas have been mentioned extensively in the case studies:23
 Land tenure: in Mali, for example, contradictions between customary law, community
law, modern law and irrigation scheme management have been highlighted; in the Kenya
REAP project, the uncertainty about land tenure prevented farmers to really commit
to the project;
 Environmental and technical engineering studies: availability of resources (aquifers
in Nigeria), climatic variability (irrigation scheme implemented without storage facilities,
in Tanzania PIDP), recurrent erosion problems threatening the sustainability of
infrastructure not addressed (Madagascar).
46 Overall agricultural support is still an important issue in many projects (ADB/ADF/OED
2002), especially for small-scale irrigation schemes. In all the case studies, farmers complain
about lack of access to inputs and outputs markets, credit facilities, and extension services28
jeopardizing the economic profitability of the schemes and their sustainability (risk of
decreased yields, low income compared to operation and maintenance costs…). Farmers’
organizations are still quite weak, even in cases where a marketing component has been
embedded into the project (Kenya REAP). In partnerships between smallholders and private
companies (e.g., Kaleya smallholder irrigation company limited, in Zambia), there is a risk
that farmers do not understand the arrangements with the company and lose their power
of decision making.
4.3.5 M&E in irrigation projects
47 Failures in monitoring and evaluation systems have been revealed mostly by the case studies
(Mali and Madagascar case studies, Tanzania MaraFIP. Tanzania PIDP, Madagascar Upper
Mandrare), and have only recently been mentioned in PCRs. The most frequent problems
are: (i) the lack of proper data collection on who are the beneficiaries and what are the
benefits (Tanzania, MaraFIP and PIDP); (ii) the lack of baseline information on production
(areas under crops, yields) and poverty status (Madagascar Upper Mandrare)29; and (iii)
the uncertainty about the source and quality of agricultural data used to assess the benefits
(one year or average, best farmers or average…). The Madagascar case study illustrates
that the focus of M&E is too often focused on disbursement and physical achievements
and not enough on economic and other indicators to measure the efficiency and
effectiveness of the project. Indicators on capacity building and institutional building
achievements are often very weak (the Madagascar case study for example underlines
that the only indicators used in terms of institution building are the number of WUAs and
the rate of payment of irrigation fees). The Mali case study points to the heterogeneity of
indicators according to consultants and projects, which in itself is not bad because indicators
need to be adapted to each project; but such heterogeneity does not facilitate systematic
M&E across projects to learn generic lessons.
28On this particular issue, the on-going OED study notes an improvement: “57% (of appraisal studies) gave significant
coverage to complementary extension linkages”, but only “19%  to marketing and credit” (OED, 2005). The cost, poverty
and private sector component studies also emphasize this concern (Inocencio et al., 2005; Van Koppen et al., 2005;
Penning de Vries et al., 2005).
29This is also confirmed by the on-going study of OED on WB-assisted agricultural water development projects: “poverty
indicators in logframe (are) quite rare” (OED, 2005).24
48 The organization of M&E systems is often to blame: in some cases M&E systems are
not designed during preparation but only during implementation; staff in charge of M&E
at country or project levels lack experience and skills to properly implement them
(Madagascar Upper Mandrare; Zimbabwe, Dombolidenje dam).
49 The use of log frames is now common in all financing institutions, but only recently (only
the most recent PCRs we reviewed mention it). However there is still a long way to go
to achieve their complete integration into project management practices. In this respect,
the way it is built and understood by all actors involved in the P&I process may be more
important than its use itself. Without referring specifically to irrigation projects, Ticehurst
and Cameron (2000) note a persisting tendency to design M&E systems to fulfill
accountability requirements of development agencies rather than the needs of beneficiaries.
They also stress that “little attention seems to be paid during implementation periods
on learning how demands change over time” (Ticehurst and Cameron, 2000, p.9), failing
to really inform future decisions. Finally, they flag the risk of premature attempts to assess
impact during implementation and over ambitious M&E systems, with resulting demotivation
of the project management team. EuropAid gives a very clear description of the logical
framework process and how it is related to the project cycle; this may serve as a basis
for implementing M&E system (European Commission, 2001). The quality of the process
depends on available information, ability of the planning team, good consultation of
stakeholders, and thorough consideration of lessons learnt throughout the project cycle.
The IFAD Guide for Project M&E provides more details on the process and examples of
rural development projects (IFAD, 2002). It emphasizes the dynamic nature of the process,
linking project design, annual planning and M&E, to the need for capacity building at all
levels (farmers, implementing team, local governments), and the importance of using log
frames and M&E as learning and adaptive management tools (IFAD, 2001, 2002, 2005).
Box 3 gives an example of the participatory process proposed for farmer-initiated and
managed smallholder irrigation schemes in Tanzania (United Republic of Tanzania, 2003).
Only the first steps are detailed here, but at each further step the participation of all
stakeholders (farmers, regional and district staff and officials) is sought to ensure a full
ownership of the objectives and action plans of the proposed sub-projects. The example
of the Tanzania PIDP project shows that it is possible to elaborate the log frame with the
participation of farmers themselves (Figure 3), increasing ownership of the project and
facilitating the collection of monitoring indicators by farmers themselves30.
30Unfortunately, this project failed to take full advantage by collecting the data needed to assess impacts on household
incomes (Tony Peacock, personal communication); for the latter ApproTEC is a better example—see Peacock 2005;
Van Koppen et al., 2005).25
Step 0: Selection of districts for program support
Why? Selection of districts to be supported, because of limited resources
How?  Awareness campaign in administrative regions
 Application by interested district council to the Irrigation Department/Project Coordination
Unit (ID/PCU)
 Evaluation and scoring of applications
 Ranking and selection of districts based on the degree of demand, local ownership and
commitment of district councils
 MoU between selected districts and ID/PCU
Who? Districts, Zonal Irrigation Unit (ZIU), ID/PCU
Results List of districts, MoUs
Step 1: Scheme selection
Why? Selection of schemes to be supported among existing schemes in selected districts
How?  District level awareness campaign
 Application by irrigator groups using a rudimentary logical framework approach
(opportunity to exploit or situation to change, what they expect to achieve, what they want
the program support for, own contribution)
 Visit of the schemes that have applied
 Evaluation, ranking and selection of schemes according criteria agreed during a participatory
process (degree of market driven demand, local ownership and commitment)
 Results of selection forwarded to the Zonal Irrigation Unit (at regional level) for validation
Who? Districts leading, irrigators groups applying, ZIU backstopping and validating
Results List of schemes to be included into District Agricultural Development Plan, simple log frames
Step 2: Participatory Action Planning
Why? Involve all stakeholders in defining and committing themselves to a workable plan of action for
the preparation of subprojects
How? Short participatory planning workshops, participants divided into groups:
 Preparation of a list of causes of identified problems by groups, presentation and discussion
of all lists to reach a consensus
 Analysis of the different steps of the preparation and implementation stage: group discussion
to decide on action for each step, sharing and consensus building
 Assessment of costs for each action, identification and agreement on responsibilities for
meeting the costs
Who? Stakeholders participating, Districts leading, ZIU/consultants facilitating
Results Action Plan for preparation
Step 3: Registration of irrigator groups as legal entities and letter of undertaking
Step 4: Participatory Diagnostic study
Step 5: Participatory Design and feasibility study
Step 6: Joint investment decision and financing agreement
Step 7: detailed designs and tender documentation
Step 8: Tendering and contract award
Step 9: Implementation
Step 10: Operation and maintenance
Box 3: Example of logical framework participatory process for farmer-initiated and
managed smallholder irrigation schemes in Tanzania.
Source: United Republic of Tanzania, 2003.26
Figure 3: Example of a log frame and work plan elaborated at local level with the
beneficiary community (Tanzania, PIDP).
Table 8: Examples of M&E indicators for irrigation projects.
Objective Indicators
Reduce poverty (see also van Koppen Number of households affected by the project, per wealth class;
et al.) incremental income; incremental food supply; number of  jobs created
Increase agricultural production Net income: suppose to collect information on yields, areas and prices
of existing crops, prices and quantity of inputs, with an indication of
their variability according to climatic variations and types of farmers
Improve food security Fraction of the production used for household consumption
Increase rural population income Number of households affected by the project, per wealth class,
side effects on local economies (in terms of job creation for example)
Building sustainable water Number of WUAs created, cost recovery rate
management institutions
4.3.6 Relationship between engineering design and O&M
50 Strong and statistically significant relationships between planning and design quality and
project results have been demonstrated by the 1995 review of the World Bank’s experience
in irrigation (Jones, 2005), and confirmed by our more recent study (Inocencio et al., 2005).
The WB report also stressed the higher frequency of changes in design and of construction
problems than in other sectors, and their correlation with project performance. It emphasized
the impacts of design on further O&M (see also Chidenga, 2003), and the fact that O&M
often differs from what was anticipated. Divergences were attributed to wrong appraisal
of water resources availability, poor design and construction, and poor attention given to
institutional arrangements, especially at local level. The lack of participation of beneficiaries
at early stages of project planning results in a lack of consistency between physical design
and institutional capacities and arrangements, i.e., designs requiring levels of management
the institution in place cannot do.27
51 Our case studies provide abundant examples of such failures: designs based on insufficient
knowledge of agricultural practices and the local situation (best time to sow, crop cycle,
peak water requirements - Tanzania MaraFIP); lack of capacities of public sector services
to carry out all the necessary engineering studies (Tanzania PIDP); shortages of water
due to flaws in design (lack of pump capacity, dam silted up, water availibility not assessed
properly).
52 Engineering designs are usually prepared by government and/or project staff, as well as
by government appointed-consultants, during project implementation. This is often a
stumbling block in the implementation process (as noted by Jones 1995), because of weak
local capacity, reluctance to engage the private sector and incompetent technical assistance
– as well as the inability of most supervision missions to provide technical support for the
very complex tasks involved in irrigation. The point is that irrigation design is often very
demanding technically; if not done correctly, the intervention will not physically function,
even if all the other factors of success are in place (participation and training of
beneficiaries, agricultural and marketing support …).
4.3.7 O&M, cost recovery and irrigation management transfer
53 The classic remedy proposed by financing institutions to cut the vicious cycle of poor
maintenance – non-payment of water charges – rehabilitation, has been to combine
increased public spending on O&M with higher water charges on users. Experience shows
that better cost-recovery does not necessarily lead to better maintenance, particularly when
water charges are not earmarked and go to the national treasury. Financial autonomy of
schemes has been recommended to enhance the scheme manager’s accountability towards
irrigators (e.g., Merrey, 1996; Small and Carruthers 1991). However, there are other ways
of achieving this autonomy than assigning fee collection and responsibility for O&M to a
user group, as argued by the ICID working group on public-private partnership (Vidal et
al., 2004). Despite an abundant literature on these issues, recent projects demonstrate a
“quite widespread lack of realism about cost recovery and hand over”; “incentives
and proposed phasing towards pricing for water application efficiency are rarely
analyzed in PADs” (Project Appraisal Documents) (OED, 2005 – see also Abdel-Dayem,
2005).
54 Irrigation management transfer to users’ groups is neither easy to implement nor successful
in all circumstances. IMT does not always receive the required policy support from
concerned ministerial departments. Therefore irrigation management transfer remains
incomplete in all our country case studies, especially in Nigeria and Madagascar. If the
conditions for successful water users associations have been abundantly documented and
analyzed (see for example Ostrom 1992; Agrawal 2001), the way to implement these
conditions is still not obvious. Vermillion and Sagardoy (1999) proposed guidelines for the
implementation of irrigation management transfer, but they emphasized that it is not possible
to formulate categorical recommendations and that these guidelines should be adapted to
the specific national and local contexts. Shah et al., (2002) found that the sub-Saharan
African context differs from the situations where IMT has worked: a legacy of dependence
parastatals agencies; high cash costs due to mechanization absence of credit, input and28
31The high costs of O&M compared to annual income in the Dombolidenje case in Zimbabwe, which comprise a high risk
of deferred maintenance, are an illustration of this.
32Our cost study found that farmer participation leads to lower-cost projects and better performance, but over-investment
in “software” such as farmer training, while helping hold down costs, makes no contribution to improving performance of
irrigation schemes.  This suggests much greater attention is needed to the quality of training and support to farmers.
output markets; insecure land rights; the small size of agricultural plots; and high costs of
pump schemes, which contribute to the low productivity of smallholder irrigation schemes
and explain the subsequent likelihood of IMT failure31.  A recent IFAD evaluation of
experiences in Ethiopia warns against being naïve about participatory demand-driven
processes in contexts where these are not yet common (IFAD 2005).
55 All our case studies report difficulties in the process of irrigation management transfer:
difficulties in water fees collection; lack of clarity on water rights and ownership of assets
(Nigeria Fadama I); lack of clarity on the share of responsibilities for maintenance in case
of disaster (Tanzania PIDP, Madagascar Upper Mandrare); difficulties for WUAs to gain
access to banking services (Nigeria Fadama I); and lack of or inappropriate training for
farmers and WUAs on irrigation management, accounting, banking and credit operations,
savings mobilization and loan repayment (Madagascar Upper Mandrare, Nigeria Fadama
I), which lead to a poor understanding by farmers of financial implications of O&M. Despite
these difficulties, as the public sector is likely to decrease its financial support to O&M of
irrigation schemes, IMT should be pursued, while taking care to design schemes that farmers
can afford to operate, and to work towards a conducive institutional and even cultural
framework. In addition, IMT reforms should be tailored to fit each country’s circumstances
(type of irrigation schemes, capacities of public and private sector, culture, etc.) (Johnson
III et al., 2004). As suggested by an AFD study on IMT in Madagascar (République de
Madagascar, 2000), there is a need for extended support to WUAs beyond project
completion to ensure their sustainability. Nevertheless, “only a few projects invested in
sustainable institutional support structures for WUAs (at local and higher levels”
(OED, 2005). It should also be noted that participation of beneficiaries from the early stages
of the project, if necessary, is not sufficient in itself and needs to be properly implemented
by experienced people32.
4.4 Responsibilities of the different actors in P&I failures
56 The failures of the P&I process identified and listed in Annex may also be analyzed from
the perspectives of the actors involved. Five categories of actors are involved in project
planning and implementation: financing institutions, governments (borrowers), executing
agencies, beneficiaries and external consultants. Each of them plays a particular role in
the process.29
4.4.1 Financing institutions’ performance
57 Financing institutions’ performance may be related to three main domains: general policies;
the roles, skills and capacities of their operational staff; and their internal structures, culture
and processes that determine the context in which staff perform their activities.
General policies and procedures
58 The lack of continuity in financing institutions’ funding priorities and in some cases the
lack of consistency with government strategies was pointed out in our case studies. It is
particularly true for bilateral financial institutions, whose priorities are strongly influenced
by the political orientation of the financing country government (see example of Mali in
Box 4).
59 Country partners blame large multilateral banks for their complex and lengthy disbursement
procedures and tight conditionalities. The absence of a local correspondent in the borrowing
country, as in ADB’s case, worsens the process. Government representatives in the
Madagascar and Mali case studies criticized the multiplicity of procedures required by
different financing institutions. This is consistent with the conclusions of DAC Task Force
on Donor Practices (OECD, 2003).
Box 4: Example of changing funding priorities in Mali.
 Three or four years ago, USAID funded post-production projects (processing,
packaging and marketing), but now gives priority to agricultural production projects
(rice production, support to seed production, etc.).
 After having favored the agricultural sector, Dutch cooperation directs its contribution
to the health sector, sanitation, education, and poverty reduction in general.
 French Cooperation interventions are judged multiple and diverse but always strongly
influenced by the political orientation of the French government and the negotiation
capacity of the Malian government at the time of project preparation.
 German cooperation has focused on capacity building and support to decentralized
financial systems for several years.
These multiple financing strategies lead the government to bend to IFIs’ will, even if the
latter does not match the country strategy.
(Source: Keita, 2004)30
Staff issues: roles, skills and resources
60 The difficulty of the role of operational staff has to be acknowledged: they should
demonstrate at the same time an accurate knowledge of the funding agency’s procedures
(task managers have to produce and to read a lot of documents along the project cycle),
and capacities in project management and in their particular area of competence (economy,
engineering, agronomy among others). As irrigation projects now require a larger spectrum
of skills (gender, HIV, environment, poverty, participatory approach, etc.) than previously,
they should be able to take into account these crosscutting issues, and therefore need to
be trained on these aspects. Despite the guidelines and manuals prepared by policy
departments, operational staff often find it difficult to integrate all these different skills. In
ADB, some task managers point to the lack of guidelines on gender issues, HIV/AIDS,
stakeholder participation, and even on the technical aspects of irrigation.
61 Their task is more difficult since they often work under time pressure. There is a general
feeling among ADB’s task managers that operational departments are under-staffed: each
task manager is in charge of 10 projects at different stages of the project cycle. Policy
and evaluation department staff members acknowledge that their colleagues from operational
departments, who hardly find time to read the documents they prepare, favor simple
prescriptions rather than detailed and comprehensive reports.
62 Morgan (2002) also argues that operational staff face conflicting purposes: to their initial
role of task accomplishment was added a mandate of building capacities of national
participants. “And finally, IDOs33 did not find ways to add a third critical purpose:
helping country participants to build the capacity to build the capacity.” (Morgan,
2002:10). Due to the little time IFIs’ operational staff spend in the field, their relationships
with government officials and project managers at country level remain weak.
63 The mix of skills within ADB’s operational department is seen as unbalanced34: for example
despite a repeated recommendation to hire more engineers, and the fact that most projects
include a construction component, operational staff feel that there is still a lack of engineers,
especially in irrigation. Instead, ADB chose to strengthen its expertise in crosscutting issues
such as environment and gender. A gap in water management capacities is also expressed.
64 Management science has demonstrated that, in any organization, individuals act according
the criteria used to assess their performance. Rightly or wrongly, ADB’s task managers
think that they are evaluated on the number of projects submitted to the Board, implemented
on time and running without problems, and the total amount of lending they generate35.
Staff financial benefits are neither connected to project performance at field level (Morgan
2002), nor to the way in which they fulfill other departments’ expectations.
33IDOs: International Development Organizations.
34As an illustration, ONAR, ADB’s operational department for Northern, Eastern and Southern Africa. comprises 15
agricultural economists, 5 agronomists, 2 irrigation engineers, 2 livestock specialists, one finance specialist, and one
environment specialist.
35This “bias towards lending at the expense of increased development impact” is also highlighted by Kilby (2000).31
65 There is no clear picture of what might be the priorities for a Task Manager: for example,
although ADB’s Operational Manual states that supervision should be considered as the
most important task for project managers, some of them consider that the appraisal report
represents most of their job. Our interviews of ADB’s staff also reveal different views on
the relative contribution of the different project phases to its success or failure.
66 All these elements may explain why, in spite of a general recognition of their importance,
issues such as characteristics of the project beneficiaries, land tenure systems, labor
organization and availability, poverty impacts, and women’s involvement in agricultural
production systems do not receive the attention they deserve. This also helps our
understanding of the insufficient involvement of financing institutions in the critical phases
of the project cycle, preparation and supervision (cited for example, in the Ethiopian case
study), with its consequences for project performance and development achievements.
Internal structure of funding agencies
67 Morgan (2002) notes that international development organizations focus more on producing
policies, strategies and guidelines than on developing an approach to implementation and
achievement of performance at field level. Even the strategic documents seem to be
directed at an external public rather than at internal use. There is no proper mean to ensure
that recommendations and guidelines are really taken into account by operational staffs.
68 Several problems of communication were mentioned in ADB between operational
departments and the Evaluation Department (OPEV), on one hand, and between operational
departments and policy departments, on the other hand. Besides the lack of communication
between country and sector operational units already mentioned, the feedback from the
Evaluation Department to operational departments is diversely appreciated:
 Operational staff often consider the Evaluation Department’s capacities to be
insufficient, and evaluation results are not well disseminated36. The absence of regular
workshops to share information on projects and experience was pointed out. Except in
working groups, staff members do not have enough time to share experiences and learn
from others about best practices. However they acknowledge a trend towards
improvement.
 OPEV argues that feedback is being improved: it takes part in the diverse levels of
the review process (Inter Department Working Group and Senior Management
Committee); matrices specifying who does what at what time have been prepared for
recommendations and monitoring; a specific website has been developed.
36For example, some task managers note that appraisal reports now focus more on financial and administrative issues at
the expense of past Bank’s experience in the country, which used to be an important chapter.32
69 Even within operational departments, communication is judged as being poor: except in
working groups, task managers do not have enough time to share their experiences and
learn from others about best practices. The absence of regular workshops to share
information on projects and experience was pointed out.
70 Regarding more specifically water management projects, it was stressed that water
management capacities are fragmented in too many departments and that there is neither
real collaboration among task managers nor coordination of related projects.  This
fragmentation retards the capacity of the IFIs to implement the IWRM approaches they
preach: domestic water projects are handled by separate departments from agricultural
water or hydropower projects, and all of them are separate from the health department.
We suggest there are many lost opportunities resulting from this fragmentation.
71 This lack of communication affects institutional memory: the changing of project
management staff (both at Bank and country level) over time, together with the absence
of effective monitoring and management information systems for project implementation
lead to losses in project information and expertise and a failure to capture and disseminate
lessons from experience.
4.4.2 Governments’ performance
72 Several authors have emphasized the responsibility of governments for project performance.
This responsibility pertains to different areas, from lack of financial and human resources
to the broad theme of commitment and ownership, to governance issues. Before going
into more details, it is worth noting that the criticisms stated below come mainly from IFIs’
staff or scientific evaluations, although some government representatives consulted during
the case studies acknowledge their own weaknesses: lack of capacities and of financial
means, lack of communication between ministerial departments, and between ministerial
department and autonomous PMU, lack of motivation of government staff.
Financial and human resources
73 It is clear that the level of financial and human resources governments allocate to project
planning and implementation affect project performance. As shown by the ADB Evaluation
Department (ADB/ADF/OED 2002), there is a strong association between per capita
income and economic performance and overall ratings of projects. This means that countries
with higher income probably have better capacities to implement projects, thus resulting in
better performance. These capacities are particularly critical, as already mentioned, at
preparation and implementation stages.
74 The first consequence of governments’ poor resources is their difficulty in mobilizing their
counterpart financial contribution; it continues with the recruitment of adequately skilled
staff to manage the project (because of low level of remuneration) and the provision of
adequate means to achieve their activities; it ends up with the poor support given to
beneficiaries to operate and maintain the irrigation systems, once they are built. In countries,33
which have entered into a process of decentralization, the lack of human and financial
resources is even worse at local level (Mali case study).
75 The range of skills necessary to implement an irrigation project is detailed further. If IFI
staff mention some improvements in country capacities, the fact that, after decades of
foreign assistance, this is still a main cause of project failure raises questions about the
ability (and willingness) of financing institutions to build capacities at national level (Morgan,
2002). As an illustration, some ADB staff rightly observe that there is no formal Bank
policy on capacity building at country level. One should also acknowledge that there is a
large variability of situations from one country to another, the reasons for which are not
well documented.  There is also the issue of building farmers’ capacities, another neglected
area.
76 The responsibility of financing institutions for some of the problems related to disbursement
and procurement procedures and monitoring and evaluation systems seems clear. There
is no evidence of standardized financial and project management tools provided to
governments by financing institutions. In fact, financing institutions have somewhat different
procurement rules, increasing the complexity for governments. This point was strongly
expressed by key officials, experts and IFI staff at the country level surveyed by the DAC
Task Force on Donor Practices (OECD, 2003), and in our own case studies. The absence
of reliable data for project preparation and evaluation can also be linked with the lack of
proper monitoring systems. Coordination among international financing institutions could
make a significant contribution to improving the efficiency of investments.
Governance
77 The theme of governance covers various causes of project failures: from the consultant
selection process (transparency, competition) to coordination among government
departments (in charge of planning and of operation), to devolution of power to autonomous
institutions (irrigation agency, water users associations). The issue of corruption and political
interference, which is not mentioned very often in PCRs and was not addressed by ADB
staff, was cited in some case studies (e.g., irregularities in the procurement of pumps in
the Fadama I project in Nigeria; political interference in the choice of schemes to be
rehabilitated, and political support to farmers who refuse to pay their irrigation fees in
Madagascar).  This remains a critical issue, but one we were not able to address in depth.
Borrower’s commitment
78 The lack of borrower’s commitment, frequently suggested as a main cause of project failure,
is not straightforward.  Detailed studies in Sri Lanka of two projects financed by an IFI
showed how complex an issue this is:  because of the dominant role played by the IFI and
its consultants, the government departments were not committed to the success of these
projects (Nijman, 1991, 1992). As for skills and capacities, there is shared responsibility
for this situation: to ensure the effectiveness of their investments, development agencies
tend to increase their involvement in and control over all steps of the project cycle, thus34
giving no incentive to governments to commit themselves to projects (Morgan, 2002). It
has been argued that governments may accept foreign aid because of the advantages
associated with projects (jobs, high fees, overhead costs, power) (Morgan, 2002) rather
than for the general stated objective of development.  Our study of costs of irrigation
investments in SSA found that the IFIs’ policy to maximize government financial contribution
to project is counter-productive—it leads to higher costs and poor performance (Inocencio
et al. 2005); the conclusion is that IFIs should perhaps help governments improve the
effectiveness of their financial and project management systems.
79 The lack of a clear strategy for the irrigation sector, or more generally for development
and poverty reduction, can be considered as an indicator of governments’ poor commitment,
and a reason for the donor-driven P&I process. The recent policy to encourage the
development of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, and more specifically of Water
Resources Management Strategies, can be seen as a sign of a changing development
approach. Our case studies (see Figure 1 and Figure 2) show that some countries have
made progress in this area. However, as underlined by IFAD, the first round of PRSPs
“were weak on identifying the fact that poverty reduction is very much a rural
problematic – and that the solution to the rural problematic lies not only in improved
social services, but in improving the economic assets and opportunities of the poor”37.
There is also little evidence that agriculture, let alone agricultural water management, was
given high priority in the first round.
4.4.3 Implementing agencies and Project Management Unit
80 Project management teams at country level must include a complex mix of skills: technical,
economical and social skills, leadership, team building and project management capacities.
It is not easy to find such talented people if there are no positive incentives to be involved
and to stay: a reasonable salary, sufficient means to carry out their tasks (vehicle, computer,
telecommunications). For example, the Madagascar case study refers generally, without
mentioning a specific project, to the lack of motivation of project management staff and
insufficient local capacities in project management and monitoring and evaluation. The
continuity in management staff also appears to be critical for project sustainability. It is
indeed important to keep records of project history and to be able to derive lessons from
it. For the same reason, it is particularly important to set up the project team right from
the preparation stage, and not only at implementation, a common practice which may be
due to lack of finance from the government. This early installation facilitates the
establishment of a relation of confidence and mutual respect with IFI staff, important for
good monitoring of the project progress and for timely decisions about possible necessary
changes.
37An IFAD Desk Review of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Process in Eastern and Southern Africa, Rome, December
2002, cited in IFAD (2004).35
81 Evaluation results show that decentralization and autonomy of the project team is a condition
of success (ADB/ADF/OED 1999; ADB/ADF/OED 2002). The case of the Tsiribihina
irrigation project in Madagascar is cited as an example of successful project management
at country level. Advantages of decentralization include better capacity to adapt the project
to local requirements and to focus on more technical issues rather than policy or strategic
ones. Communication channels and reporting procedures should be carefully designed and
implemented, as some case studies reported poor communication between ministerial
departments and the PMU, and among ministerial departments (Zambia).
82 Nevertheless, there is no common agreement about the ideal degree of autonomy of the
PMU: some recommend that the government executing agency should use its own staff
for the PMU, arguing that staff especially recruited for the project may affect its
sustainability (these people are more likely to abandon the project before completion) and
the building of experience within the executing agency38). Some others recommend a mix
of international consultants and national staff to mitigate the supposed lower skills of the
latter and provide mentoring services. There are examples showing that autonomy can
result in some poor sub-project choices when there is no adequate quality assurance
(Zimbabwe Dombolidenje), or lead to major flaws in design in the absence of an effective
steering committee or technical oversight (Tanzania). Box 5 reports the experience of project
team recruitment process in Mali.
38For example, Merrey showed that the use of special units to implement the various donor projects in Egypt hindered the
integration of project innovations into the normal management processes of the Ministry of Public Works and Water
Resources (Merrey, 1997).
Box 5: Choice of project team in Mali.
Project teams are chosen based on an agreement between Malian government and IFIs. Small
project management teams are prefered. Therefore, in addition to the project coordinator,
the team may include a financial officer; a rural engineer; a capacity building specialist; an
M&E officer; a secretary; a driver; and a guard. Executive staff members are recruited
through open tenders with a no-objection by IFIs. Project coordinators and senior executives
who had previously been state civil servants seconded to projects with an (often very low)
bonus, are now entirely recruited through tenders by projects. Civil servants who want to
participate in projects must resign from their position. This new approach allows providing
them better remuneration, gives them a higher sense of responsibility, and encourages them
to better manage project resources. Regarding specifically the choice of coordinator, some
interviewed IFI staff underline that they do not put pressure on government. However, they
remark that a civil servant chosen by government to do the planning during the preparation
phase, even if he/she is competent and can carry out project coordination, may be replaced
at the last minute without any valid reason. It is the reason why financing institutions prefer
the tender procedure for the recruitment of executive staff.
(Source : Keita, 2004)36
Box 6: Recruitment of project staff in the Fadama Project in Nigeria.
Although the recruitment of project implementation staff at local, state and federal levels
was very transparent, there are pockets of problems here and there with recruitment of
staff based on favoritism. For instance, facilitators for Fadama II were first recruited at the
national level before the state implementing agencies clamored for the recruitment of these
staff directly by themselves in their own communities. This was done in order to recruit
facilitators with knowledge of, and familiarity with, Fadama localities where they would work.
However, some grossly ineffective, inexperienced and unqualified facilitators have succeeded
in being recruited as facilitators in some of the participating states and Local Government
Councils due to political interference.
(Source : Omilola, 2004)
83 There is no evidence in the literature we reviewed on the governmental process of choosing
project managers and executing agency staff, and on the likelihood of political interference
in this process. However, irregularities in staff recruitment were reported in some case
studies (for example change of staff without valid reason in Mali, see Box 5) or in the
Fadama II Project in Nigeria (Box 6).
4.4.4 Consultants
84 International or national consultants can be involved at different stages of a project: at
preparation to carry out specific studies or to do the design, at implementation to manage
the project or implement particular components (often construction or design of sub-projects),
and at supervision and evaluation. In the first two cases the borrower hires them, in the
last one it is the financing institution.
85 There is an unsolved debate about the types of consultants to be used.  Is it worth engaging
highly skilled international staff, who are relatively expensive, may propose technical choices
not adapted to local conditions with which they are not familiar, and may have a poor
commitment to the project?  Or should the emphasis be on hiring local consultants who
are less expensive, may be more familiar with local conditions, but are thought in some
cases to have less capacity?  Of course local consultants do not always have knowledge
about local conditions; and if capacity is an issue, the project provides an opportunity to
build this capacity. In principle, best practice appears to (a) ensure a level playing field
among national and international consultants and (b) procure by international competitive
bidding (Tony Peacock, personal communication).  However, if building local capacity is
an explicit goal, pairing of experienced international consultants with local counterparts is
a viable option.37
86 Chisenga (2004) presents an extreme example of poor international consultant intervention
in Malawi, where the lack of capacity to manage international consultants, responsible for
the engineering design, resulted in a spate of implementation flaws. In this case, hopefully
exceptional, there was obviously a quality assurance problem in the procurement and
supervision processes. Other project managers at national level during the IFAD Mwanza
workshop expressed the same kind of mistrust towards international technical assistance.
Local stakeholders surveyed for the Madagascar case study also report misunderstandings
between foreign technical assistants, project managers, and government officials.
87 On the other hand, successful experiences are reported, including in Madagascar, where
the recruitment of a local senior engineer to supervise the design of rice irrigation schemes
helped to develop a local framework and guidelines for manual work done by beneficiaries
(assisted by a technician). The same approach has then been successfully used to
rehabilitate several schemes.
88 Getting the right terms of reference (ToRs) for consultants and technical assistants is critical.
ToRs should include a requirement to partner local and foreign consultants to build local
capacities while including more local knowledge. Uphoff (1992a) analyzes a case in Sri
Lanka where engineers learned to work effectively with farmer organizations in designing
and constructing field and distributary canals.  In that project, international consultants
mentored local social scientists who took the lead in assisting the engineers to work more
effectively with farmer organizations.
89 Whether engineering design should be performed by government departments or by private
consultants raises, apart from efficiency considerations, the issue of accountability: if
farmers invest in contributing to the capital costs and the works do not physically function
because of an engineering design fault, where do they obtain recourse? If farmers were
expected to engage more in agricultural markets, it would be preferable for them to obtain
engineering design services from the private sector and sue the latter if they do not perform;
but this may not be feasible in many cases.
4.4.5 Beneficiaries’ participation
90 The lack of beneficiaries’ participation throughout the project cycle has often been cited
as a cause of failure of water development projects (e.g., ADB/ ADF/ OED, 2002; Diemer
and Huibers, 1991; Bonneval et al., 2002).  The participation of women is particularly
sensitive and is generally given very little attention (see for example the Fadama I project
in Nigeria)39. Participation often comes after the overall project is designed; i.e., the design
is not based on beneficiaries’ demands and interest. This late participation often results in
a lack of sense of ownership from the beneficiaries and little involvement in O&M.
Interaction between external assistance and local participation is a key factor of success
(see for example Vermillion and Al-Shaybani, 2004).
39Kweka (1998) provides a case study of a small scale irrigation project aimed at women in Tanzania.38
91 Recent evolution of IFI policies and guidelines show a trend towards more involvement of
beneficiaries in project preparation and implementation. However, the lack of involvement/
participation of intended project beneficiaries in both project planning and implementation
is still noticed in some recent projects, for example the Fadama I project in Nigeria (Omilola,
2004). The reason probably lies in the insufficient capacities of project staff at national
and local level compounded by the little experience of IFI staff involved in preparation
and supervision. In authoritarian political regimes, participation can also be seen as a risk
by undermining the power in place and government may therefore be reluctant to fully
implement it.  A recent evaluation by IFAD of its small-scale irrigation investments calls
for being realistic about participation in contexts where it is relatively new (IFAD 2005).
Finally at local level, participation can be hampered by the high level of illiteracy among
poor rural people (mentioned for example in Mali case study - Keita, 2004).
4.5 Local actors’ points of view on P&I processes
92 Failures and successes cited by local actors do not differ from those mentioned in project
documents or expressed by IFI staff and reported in the desk review report (Morardet
2004a). Of course, each category of actors has a tendency to point out others’ faults, i.e.,
government officials and project managers complain about slow and complex IFI procedures
to release funds, poor support and communication during implementation, fluctuating
priorities, and focus on disbursement achievements rather than on development
effectiveness; and financing institution representatives point to political interference in the
choice of project staff and in procurement process, and lack of logistic and financial means
of governmental agencies. However, in some countries, local actors acknowledge their
own weaknesses: lack of capacity and financial means; lack of communication between
ministerial departments, and between ministerial department and PMU; and lack of
motivation of government staff. Farmers seem to be more interested in project achievement
and post-implementation constraints than in P&I processes, on which those consulted did
not express any view.
4.6 Evolution over time of P&I processes
93 Although improving, the quality of preparation studies is still insufficient on environmental,
social and economic aspects (especially regarding marketing issues and assessment of
poverty status). However, the most recent projects show signs of improvement regarding
environmental aspects: systematic aquifer assessment in Fadama II, catchment-irrigated
scheme approach in Madagascar.
94 The participation of beneficiaries remains very poor, even non-existent, in the planning phase,
and is often limited to provision of labor and local material during implementation. Noticeable
exceptions are VRES project and Bewani scheme in the Office du Niger area in Mali,
Dodicha SSI- ESRDF project in Ethiopia, and PRBM-ADB and PHBM-IFAD projects in
Madagascar. The Fadama II project in Nigeria intends to focus on community-driven
development, but it is too early to see how and whether it will really be implemented.39
95 Even though almost all projects that were analyzed include a formal WUA, the process of
irrigation management transfer is not completed: WUAs encounter problems recovering
irrigation fees, accessing credit and repaying loans, realizing outstanding maintenance and
providing farmers with adequate agricultural inputs. In Nigeria, numerous Fadama Users
Associations have been established but they are suffering from lack of management
capacity, and it is not clear how the second phase will address this flaw. In Madagascar,
only 20 out of 293 WUAs created through the PPI2 project are operational. Lack of a
proper monitoring and evaluation system has been cited as a persistent major flaw in all
country case studies. Mali and Madagascar are showing interesting evolution of their P&I
processes (Box 7).
Box 7: Evolution of P&I processes in Mali and Madagascar.
In Mali, large-scale « ready to use » irrigation projects of the 1970s have been abandoned
in favor of small-scale irrigated schemes (less than 100 ha), with the objectives of yield
stabilization, higher agricultural intensity and therefore higher profitability of investments.
Farmers and more generally rural communities have been involved in planning and
implementing projects from the beginning, to reduce the government’s financial burden.
More original are multi-IFI projects, and the integration of irrigation projects within rural
development programs developed by local government (decentralization process). The
process of decentralization is also apparent in the setting up of autonomous PMUs, with
specifically recruited staff (previously PMUs were composed of civil servants), and in the
taking over of post implementation routine monitoring by regional or local technical offices,
with the support of national departments in case of specific difficulties. Finally, pilot phases
are more systematic in new projects.
In Madagascar, new projects developed since 2000 are characterized by a more integrated
approach in terms of development (plateforme riz) and environment (catchment approach),
and a better involvement of farmers in formulation and design of projects. Increasing
communication among various stakeholders, specifically between government and financing
institutions, is highlighted: better coordination of various IFIs’ interventions (secrétariat multi-
bailleurs, Task force BV PI), participatory processes used in the elaboration of the new
irrigation policy (government officials at national, provincial and local levels, WUAs, NGOs,
financing institutions, technical assistance). The Malagasy government is taking more
responsibility in preparation of projects: for example it followed a participatory process for
the formulation of guidelines for implementation of irrigation projects in the framework of
the BV-PI program, to be applied nationwide. The national irrigation strategy is being up-
dated, with the participation of all stakeholders.
(Sources: Keita, 2004; Rajoelison, 2004)40
4.7 P&I of irrigation projects in the new development assistance framework
96 In February 2003, the WB and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) organized
a high level Forum on Aid Harmonization that concluded with a definition of principles and
best practices in this domain (OECD 2003). This document marks a stage in the evolution
of development assistance in the last decade characterized by a greater focus on policy
dialogue among financing institutions and country partners and a diversification of funding
mechanisms (sector approach, budget support). The low efficiency and high transaction
costs (for implementation and monitoring of funding) of past project-based assistance and
the diverse or even conflicting objectives of the different international financing institutions
motivated this evolution. This new framework, whose objectives are to increase aid
efficiency and country ownership, goes beyond the mere adaptation of financing institutions’
procedures and practices to put country concerns at the center of aid mechanisms: country
partners are supposed to develop a national development strategy which will serve as a
basis of the interventions of international financing institutions (e.g., PRSPs) (Jaudoin and
Leclerc, 2003).
97 The elaboration of a national strategy, which may take time, should be a participatory
process including the civil society, and leading to a shared vision of the country’s future
development. For financing institutions it implies modifications in their ways of providing
aid: more focus on capacity building and institutional development, support to the elaboration
of development strategy40, coordination among international financing institutions (which
offers theoretically opportunities for sharing experience but may prove difficult for bilateral
financing institutions which, in the past, have sought political and commercial influence
through project-based assistance).
98 However, conditions for success of the new development assistance framework, in particular
of good governance, are far from being common. It thus comprises some risks, because
it relies on a double bet: the willingness of country partners to carry the strategic exercise
through to a successful conclusion, and the benefit of a real dialogue between financing
institutions and the country partner. It will require in particular an agreement on the definition
of conditionalities and performance indicators. Policy dialogue, if designed as a learning
and experience sharing approach, is therefore very important.
99 An internal World Bank review of the rural content of 12 PRSPs41 (Cord et al., 2002 cited
by Proctor, 2002) showed that the treatment of rural poverty is still not satisfactory. Despite
rural development being a priority sector in all the reviewed PRSPs, there is no systematic
and consistent approach to addressing core rural issues in each of the sections of PRSPs
(participatory processes, poverty diagnosis, targets and indicators, and priority public actions).
40This is intended to handle the contradiction between the need of country partners for support and the risk of interference
from donors, concerned with the wise use of funds.
41For Africa: Uganda; Tanzania; Burkina Faso; Mauritania; Mozambique; Niger; Guinea; Zambia; and Gambia, and for Latin
America: Honduras; Nicaragua; and Bolivia.41
The participation of rural stakeholders and their sectoral line Ministries in the PRSP process
seems rather limited. Moreover, almost all the strategies refer to the rural poor as a
homogenous group; the heterogeneity of the rural poor is not adequately recognized. Rural
poverty rates are often not disaggregated by gender, landholdings or ethnicity. Little
quantitative information is provided on sources of income and livelihood diversity, the
distribution of land assets, and participation in various markets. Similarly, little detail is
provided on the qualitative or quantitative nature of determinants of rural poverty, their
relative importance and the process by which they affect the different groups of rural poor.
Indicators for rural poverty reduction proposed for monitoring do not always have quantified
targets and in some cases are not easily quantifiable or monitored. Linkages between
indicators and issues raised by the poverty diagnostics are rarely explicit. As rural
development is treated as a crosscutting issue, proposed actions to address it are scattered
among many areas. The discussion of the issues is fairly generic and brief and the
institutional framework for their implementation generally not fully specified. Actions
proposed tend to be investment oriented, and major policy changes have not been initiated.
Rural actions are not yet fully prioritized and /or sequenced. In few cases are priority actions
explicitly linked to impact and outcomes indicators, even if they are broadly consistent with
them. Similarly the linkages between the priority public actions and rural poverty are implicit.
100 Sector Wide Approaches (SWAps), an instrument initiated by the WB primarily in the social
sector, comprise a mix of policy change, institutional development, and material investment.
They “are held to be the most effective platforms for pursuit of common sectoral
objectives – when linked to overarching statements of development purpose (the
PRSP) and the corresponding statement of priority in financial allocations” (IFAD,
2004, p.7). Experiences of agricultural SWAps in SSA are quite rare (probably because of
the complexity of the agricultural sector), relatively recent, and limited to Eastern and
Southern Africa. Therefore, it is difficult to assess their performance compared to projects.
Their success implies a reconnaissance of the central role of agricultural development for
rural poverty reduction (which is obviously not the case in many PRSPs), and a strong
commitment from government and financing institutions to change their policies and
practices. SWAps in themselves do not guarantee more effective poverty reduction, and
the process of building them is more important than the adoption of the instrument. An
IFAD issue paper gives insights on the possible problems and errors to avoid in implementing
agricultural SWAps for poverty reduction (IFAD, 2004).
101 In the short and medium term, project-based assistance will remain appropriate as part of
a transition phase, while sector programs are still emerging; in countries in crisis where
conditions for sector approach or budget support success are not present; and to explore
innovative approaches for poverty reduction. Table 9 summarizes the advantages and
drawbacks of the different funding mechanisms in the agricultural water management
sector.42
Table 9: Advantages and drawbacks of different funding mechanisms of development
assistance.
Instruments Advantages Drawbacks
Project approach  Allows for innovation  Poor coordination of different IFIs’
 More clarity in use of funds interventions
and their direct outcomes  High costs of implementation and
 Mobilizes resources focused monitoring for IFIs
on specific objectives
Sector approach  Helps government to provide  Reduced opportunities for
adequate resources for project innovation
implementation and functioning  More difficult to document linkages
(in particular extension services, between investments and outcomes
capacity building, statistical systems,  Dependence on government
research and education systems…) processes for financial accountability
 Opportunities for harmonization,
up-scaling and replication
 Governments can develop and apply
own procedures rather than trying to
please multiple IFIs
 Governments can avoid spreading resources
among too many different projects
Budget support  Better ownership of development strategy  Risk to lose focus on agricultural
 Help government to provide its financial development in general and
counterpart agricultural water development in
 Impose more transparency on the use of particular (Eicher, 2004)
funds from government  Risk of a shift of funds from the
agricultural sector to other sectors
 Risk of a top-down and opaque
process of fund allocation,
weakening the empowerment of local
stakeholders, and therefore the
sustainability of irrigation projects
 Risk to implement projects only in
the most accessible and best-known
regions
 Risk of inappropriate transfer of
funds from national government to
local governments and of competition
between urban and rural areas (with
a clear bias towards the former)
 Risk of more dependency on external
assistance
Source: IFAD (2004), IFAD and FAO staff interviews; authors’ analysis.43
5 RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Overview
102 It is very dangerous to offer “prescriptions” as if, like a medical doctor, we have completed
a scientific diagnosis complete with laboratory tests and know exactly what is the problem
and what is “the” solution.  In fact, it has been argued that for the past three decades
there have been altogether too many prescriptions offered as if they are panaceas, ready-
made solutions to all problems (Merrey et al., 2006).  In view of the complexity of the
problem, the huge range of variation among countries, communities, and agro-ecologies,
and the uncertainties of social science, we offer the following list of recommendations
with considerable humility.  These are recommendations and ideas we have gleaned from
the literature, interviews, case studies and our own experiences.  Some may be useful as
is, some not at all; but most of them, to be useful, need to be adapted to specific
circumstances and then operationalized.  Nevertheless, we trust that much of what we
offer can be useful.
103 Before proposing the detailed recommendations, we offer two overarching ones that we
believe are essential for future success.  The first is that project management should
not be viewed as an “overhead” that is to be minimized, but an essential feature of
successful projects, with potentially huge pay-offs. It requires the deployment of adequate
human and financial resources and is applicable at financing institution as well as government
and partner level.  This finding is supported strongly by the study on costs of irrigation,
which demonstrates the positive payoff to investing in good planning and management
(Inocencio et al., 2005).
104 The second overarching recommendation is that projects should be explicitly designed
as “experiments” to learn lessons on how to improve P&I processes (Rondinelli, 1983),
feeding a knowledge base on planning and implementation of agricultural water projects
(costs, technical options, standards/norms, policies, inventory of expertise …), strengthening
the institutional memory of governments and financing institutions, and ultimately creating
an environment that encourages and enables increased and better quality investments. This
implies:
 Considering projects as learning opportunities, by including applied research and
experiments, based on the principles of a “learning organization”, and helping countries
adopt a more learning organization approach to their programs;
 Seeing projects as capacity building opportunities: financing institutions and governments
need to invest much more in capacity strengthening (policies, sustainable and effective
institutions, policy analysis, project management skills, etc.) at all levels – government,
private sector, farmers, etc. Increased capacity broadly defined will create an
environment that encourages and enables increased and better quality investments;44
 Designing projects in a way that fits local needs and capacities for implementation
and subsequent operation, and builds capacity to move forward by providing successful
experiences.  Effective targeting is essential, and targeting the appropriate partners
equally important: trying to focus directly on the poorest of the poor in an irrigation
project may not be the best way to reduce poverty for example.
5.2 Recommendations specific to agricultural water development projects
5.2.1 For Governments, with support from International Financing Institutions:
At all stages
105 Participation: the early implementation of effective participatory approaches allowing the
identification of beneficiaries’ needs and preferences and their participation in project
identification, design and implementation is very important, in order to strengthen local water
and irrigation management institutions and ensure the sustainability of irrigation systems.
106 At all stages of the process, rural people should be considered as partners of development
rather than ‘beneficiaries” or (worse) “target groups” (Uphoff, 1992b), and their ideas,
management skills, technical insights, and organizational capabilities should be harnessed
and enhanced. This implies changing the mindset of providers of external assistance
(governments, financing institutions, consultants) towards a more collaborative approach.
Therefore, real implementation of partners’ participation would require: (i) building capacities
of project managers, specifically engineers, in participatory approaches; (ii) providing
incentives that encourage them to interact with local stakeholders (for example including
criteria in their performance assessment system); and (iii) placing more emphasis on training
rural people both in terms of technical knowledge and empowerment. Formal review
procedures of project proposals by all stakeholders including farmers can be included in
the decision process.
Identification
107 No investment in costly infrastructure should be planned without having beforehand
implemented the conditions for its beneficial use: secure land access for poor farmers;
reasonable access to financial services (savings and credit); analysis of market opportunities
and risks; where appropriate, enhanced collective organization of farmers; organized access
to quality inputs; and training of farmers in new agricultural practices and irrigation
management at individual and collective level.  Countries and regions where these basic
conditions are in place should be given priority. In other cases, specific activities to strengthen
these aspects should be included within projects or developed as parallel programs.
108 Whenever possible, identification of projects should include the participation of rural
populations and be based on an in-depth community needs assessment that allows better
targeting of beneficiaries. An identification brief should be issued at the end of the process
and reviewed by all stakeholders including farmers.45
Preparation
109 A careful situation analysis of the local context is necessary. Four categories of issues
should be considered:  (i) socio-economic aspects, including an analysis of the diversity of
households in terms of poverty status, assets and objectives, with particular attention to
gender issues, and an assessment of the economic environment of farms (rural credit, input
supply, output markets,) and of the social and institutional context (resources management,
social cohesion); (ii) technical aspects (technical capacities of farmers, and local service
providers, availability of spare parts and back up, affordability, cost of investment and O&M,
user friendly design); (iii) environmental aspects (location, availability and reliability of water
resources, soils, impacts on groundwater and catchment); and (iv) health impacts (nutritional
and economic status, quantity and quality of domestic water supply, vector-borne diseases,
… see McCartney et al., 2005 for a detailed list). Data on agricultural production (crops,
yields, areas, prices) should be collected at farm level taking into account the diversity of
farmers and of natural settings and their variability over time according to climate and
markets. The economic and financial analysis based on these data should take into account
environmental and market risks.
110 The importance of cost-effective engineering design needs to be integrated by all
stakeholders if the declining trend in irrigation investment is to be reversed. In addition,
design choices should take into account local knowledge (farmers and local experts) on
water resources, soils and agricultural practices particularly in rehabilitation of traditional
schemes. Technical options should also be adapted to the state of social organization (for
example, if the design requires strong cohesion of the farmers’ group, which does not exist
before the project, difficulties in O&M are likely to occur). Impact of technical options on
future O&M costs and organization should be considered seriously, and O&M manuals
prepared as part of the planning and implementation process.
111 The implementing team (be it a governmental agency or an autonomous PMU) should
be set up as early as possible. Whenever possible it should include government staff to
ensure capitalization of knowledge in government organizations. Government staff may
be complemented with internationally or nationally recruited staff as required. In the choice
of the project manager, particular attention should be given to his/her ability for networking
(which can ease the implementation). As stressed above, project staff should be provided
with adequate incentives to sustain their motivation (wages in relation to their skills and
level of autonomy, performance-related bonus, housing allowance, good working conditions,
trust). Apart from basic facilities to undertake their tasks, good mix of skills and appropriate
training, they should be given some autonomy for decision-making. The degree of autonomy
should fit the managerial and technical capacities of the team and of the organization in
charge of supervision. In any case an appropriate reporting system, control and back up
should be implemented to ensure the quality of the process. Roles and responsibilities should
be clearly defined from the outset. It is recommended that the implementing team focus
on coordination, information, control and follow-up evaluation and that contracting activities
are delegated to financial and procurement experts. The organization of project management
should be in line with the organization of local governments, while limiting the number of
decision levels in the review and approval process to what is necessary for accountability.46
In case of programmatic interventions, subprojects financiers, designers, implementers and
supervisors need to be more concerned with the technical and financial implications of
subproject selection and design.
Implementation
112 Contract firms: it is important in the long run to create a favorable environment for building
capacity of local contractors and for encouraging them to get involved in construction
activities and participate in bids. Specific training sessions in tender writing and technical
aspects can be organized. It is also important to adapt the size and content of bidding to
the capacities of local enterprises, without compromising the social and economic objectives
of the project.
113 Private sector and NGOs’ capacities can be used to compensate shortcomings in public
sector capacities (especially to implement participatory approaches). The role of government
here should be to create the enabling environment that facilitate private investments,
including policies (a) facilitating access to financing systems; (b) improving support (physical
and social) for infrastructure; (c) reducing risk through access to information and better
equipped micro, small and medium enterprises; and (d) facilitating demand creation through
promotion of products produced by the private sector and facilitation of market linkages,
strong institutions to enforce laws, effective infrastructure (roads, communications, major
water development, etc.) (see Penning de Vries et al., 2005 for more details).
After project completion
114 If the decentralization of water and infrastructure management after completion of the
project is also a clear factor of success, that does not mean a total and rapid withdrawal
of state support. The process of IMT should be planned carefully (see for example the
guidelines for designing institutional reform of the irrigation sector proposed by Johnson
III et al., 2004) and requires time. Government support to farmers and their organizations
should be extended beyond project completion, especially in terms of training (agricultural,
financial management, leadership and entrepreneurship), extension services (well trained
development agents assigned to irrigated schemes), market linkages and management of
water users associations. For this type of support, sector-based approaches may be more
appropriate than projects.
115 O&M: a clear agreement (with a formal contract) between government entities and WUAs
on the ownership of the assets and the share of responsibility regarding light and heavy
maintenance should be prepared before implementing construction. Raising the level of
professionalism in O&M services is of utmost importance to ensure the sustainability of
existing and new irrigation schemes. New institutional and financial arrangements, with a
focus on quality service, should be sought to efficiently perform O&M functions, such as
federation of WUAs and/or contracting of irrigation services to private services providers
(Vidal et al., 2004). Early experiences of such arrangements in SSA should be carefully47
monitored and evaluated to derive and disseminate lessons. In any case, IMT reforms need
to be carefully adapted to the national, regional and local contexts. Mechanism to calculate
and levy irrigation fees should be made clear and discussed with farmers during before
completion of works. Crisis plans (in case of technical, climatic, agricultural or financial
crisis) should be discussed among farmers, service providers and government, well before
any crisis occurs, and provision for an emergency fund implemented (Tardieu, 2004). For
example, the development of mechanisms to facilitate important repairs, such as the Fonds
d’entretien des réseaux hydro-agricoles (FERHA) in Madagascar (Box 8), should be
encouraged.
Box 8: Fonds d’entretien des réseaux hydro-agricoles (FERHA) in Madagascar.
Facing difficulties to maintain and repair head works, frequently damaged by extreme climatic
events, the Malagasy government is thinking of creating a special maintenance fund using
taxes on rice imports. The creation of this fund is under study by the Task Force « Bassin
Versant – Périmètre irrigué », which includes representatives of Government and its
technical and financial partners (research institutions, financing institutions, FAO…). This
Task Force, which is a platform for discussion, validation and decision-making, was set up
in 2004 by the Ministry of Agriculture to prepare the « Programme National Bassin Versant
– Périmètres Irrigués ». The study includes a description of implementation modalities,
elaboration of its regulations and organization, and planning, programming and budgeting of
maintenance.
(Source : Rajoelison, 2004; J.F. Jullien, AFD, personal communication)
116 Markets: Governments should facilitate market access by farmers through a range of
interventions: facilitating farmers’ access to market information and storage facilities;
encouraging investments in processing plants using the farmers as out growers; improving
rural transport systems; undertaking detailed market studies as part of the project
preparation; facilitating marketing arrangement between WUAs and cooperative unions;
and improving access to banking facilities (credit, savings).
5.2.2 For International Financing Institutions:
Preparation
117 It is recommended to increase the participation of international development agencies (at
least for ADB and WB) in project identification and preparation. This increased involvement
is not to impose IFIs’ points of view on governments. On the contrary, it would allow a
better understanding by IFI staff of the local context and an enhanced capacity to properly
appraise the proposed project. For national staff, it would provide the possibility to learn
from the financing institution’s experience. This would probably mean devoting more human
and financial resources to this phase from the IFIs’ point of view. Besides, the composition48
of appraisal teams should be carefully thought out (more diversified skills, more staffs and
more time spent on field). In particular, it is recommended that appraisal missions include
irrigation engineers and water management specialists.
Implementation
118 There is wide agreement on the necessity to improve the supervision provided by financing
institutions, both in quantity (at least one supervision mission per year, more staff involved)
and quality (more diversified skills). More supervision from financing institutions should be
considered as an opportunity for knowledge sharing and mutual learning, and a way
to ensure the quality of implementation. Mutual respect and confidence that can be built
this way are factors of success.
119 The framework for supervision should be mutually agreed between financing institutions
and government. Supervision missions could associate IFI staff, consultants if required,
government staff, project staff, and partner/beneficiary representatives, all these participants
undertaking field visit together.
120 It is recommended that the borrower, PMU and beneficiaries have the opportunity to
comment on the terms of reference of consultants, participate in the selection process,
and give feedback on the performance of the consultants for future reference.
121 Supervision (and subsequent evaluation) should focus on development effectiveness and
sustainability rather than on implementation of the project (physical achievements,
disbursement) per se. In addition, it is critical to maintain a high technical quality of designs
and construction of infrastructure so it is robust and cost-effective. The quick dissemination
of supervision mission reports from supervisors to PMU and all stakeholders would help
in adjusting design, mitigating unexpected constraints, and reviewing operational guidelines
for project implementation.
122 More flexibility in implementation needs to be allowed, to adapt the design to the local
context, provided that an adequate quality assurance and supervision system is set up.
123 Long-term technical and financial support to experiments with new institutional and financial
arrangements for O&M is recommended. Special attention should be given to addressing
the various risks facing irrigation services providers (political, non-recovery, water scarcity
and variability of water demand). Adequate monitoring and evaluation of these experiments
is necessary prior their adaptation and dissemination to other contexts.
5.2.3 For financing institutions and governments:
124 The general idea is here to strengthen the collaboration among IFIs, national and local
project staff during various phases of project cycle in order to improve mutual confidence
and ease problem solving.49
Preparation
125 Better understanding of poverty: Development agencies and governments should
collaborate to develop methodologies to achieve a better understanding of poverty and how
agricultural water management projects can contribute to its reduction. The use of the
Sustainable Livelihood (SL) Approach developed by DFID (Carney, 1998, cited by Ticehurst
and Cameron, 2000), that explicitly “recognizes  complex and dynamic relationships
between the activities, opportunities, entitlements, risks and assets that shape people’s
livelihood strategies” (Ticehurst and Cameron, 2000, p.15) is suggested. The SL approach
emphasizes the importance of learning throughout the implementation process and focuses
on the link between micro effects (on people’s livelihood) and the macro impacts
(development and poverty reduction)42.
126 Planning: The use of the logical framework matrix as a development tool should be
mainstreamed, including at the rural communities level.  Project log frames should be
developed in a participatory way, bringing together beneficiary partner representatives,
project management staff and members of the steering or supervising committees to ensure
ownership of projects at country level. The quality of the process of building the log frame
is more important than the tool itself. Financing institutions’ and national staff should jointly
elaborate a monitoring and evaluation system to facilitate project follow-up (see below).
Particular attention should be given to linking the policy dialogue exercise (PRSP, sectoral
development plan) with participatory planning exercises at local level. The use of pilot
studies and learning-by-doing approaches is also encouraged, since they allow capitalizing
on experience and hence really building local capacities.
127 Project organization: It is also suggested to limit the number of components of projects
so that they are manageable with limited local capacities. Implementing simple projects
successfully is more likely to build the capacity of local human resources than failing to
implement a complex project.
Implementation
128 M&E: The planning exercise based on developing the logical framework should be followed
by the early implementation of a monitoring and reporting system and the early recruitment
of the staff to manage it. As for the log frame, the M&E development process should be
as participatory as possible. M&E systems should be conceived as a way to systematize
institutional learning at all levels, and shortening the feedback loop (Ticehurst and Cameron,
2000). Adequate training should be provided to government and project staff ahead of the
project start. Harmonization of M&E systems across projects and among IFIs will facilitate
42Better targeting of poor people is also addressed in Van Koppen et al.); and the SL framework is applied in the private
sector component study (Penning de Vries et al., 2005).50
their implementation and also sharing of lessons learned. M&E should clearly focus on
development achievements and poverty reduction effectiveness. In addition, it is
recommended that M&E systems be designed to respond to country and end-users’
priorities, rather than to fit the needs of development agencies (Ticehurst and Cameron,
2000). Monitoring of institutional changes must include an assessment of the local
perception of these changes. The component on poverty reduction of the present
Collaborative Program proposes a list of indicators that could be integrated into the M&E
system to assess the impacts of projects on poverty reduction (Van Koppen et al.); however,
this is an area where further work is needed to identify practical and useful poverty
indicators.
129 Indicators of project impacts on beneficiaries should be easily measurable and relate directly
to planed outcomes. It is particularly important to use quantitative data directly measured
at farm level in place of qualitative proxies.
130 Farmers should be encouraged to measure their results themselves, with the support of
project staff or extension officers. Alternatively, a sample of farms selected across the
various social strata and geographic positions in the scheme can be monitored over several
years. Further thought needs to be given to relevant criteria to monitor WUAs performances
and institution building. All the indicators should be compared to the baseline survey
conducted for project appraisal.
Agricultural water management projects in general
131 Government and financing institutions would both benefit from the development of a
knowledge base on agricultural water management, which will gather, store and
disseminate useful information at operational and decision-making levels on best practical
models for designing and implementing agricultural water development projects. This
knowledge base can be developed either at national or regional levels, according to the
interest and state of reflection in the considered countries. This knowledge base could
comprise among others:
 A database of unit costs of irrigation and drainage projects to help financing institution
and government staff prepare budgets at appraisal; it would be updated regularly with
results of completed projects (or when the bill is received and paid); it is of particular
importance that this database be widely shared among financing institutions,
governments, consultants, etc.  It could be managed by a consortium of country partners,
multilateral and bilateral financing institutions, or by sub-regional organizations, or even
by the NEPAD Secretariat;
 The identification and promotion of a selected set of technologies having the following
characteristics: low interdependence among irrigators, high potential for stepwise
upgrading, easy maintenance or replacement, water savings, low dependence on
external assistance, and high potential for up-scaling;
 The development of regional irrigation design standards and best practices, especially
for smallholder irrigation technologies;51
 Documented and evaluated experiences of new institutional and financial arrangements
for O&M (e.g., public-private partnerships);
 The documentation of cases and databases of projects (as is currently undertaken by
SWMNET in eastern and central Africa);
 A directory and a network of experienced engineers (government staff, national and
regional consultants).
132 Networking activities, visits and workshops could be organized to inform project managers
on technologies and available expertise and to develop standardized processes and design
methods. This can be completed by more standard training sessions, and gathering IFI
staff, government staff (at national and local levels) and project staff on crosscutting issues
(participatory approach, gender issues, marketing aspects, among others), to fill the present
gaps in capacities43. The program of such workshops should be based on the needs
expressed by participants, and training quality should be assessed.
133 In the longer term, revision and strengthening of education and training systems in
agricultural water development are important. In particular, the integration of training modules
on participation, gender, environment…in the degree courses of agricultural engineers and
economists would help enhance initial capacities.
134 Finally, the strengthening of information and statistical systems on environment and
agriculture is necessary to do good preparation.
5.3 Recommendations regarding development assistance in general
135 Simplifying procedures: our main recommendation is to really implement the
recommendations of the Task Force on Donors Practices of the OECD Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) (OECD, 2003) in the following areas: framework for IFI
co-operation, country analytic work and preparation of projects and programs, measuring
performance in public financial management, reporting and monitoring, financial reporting
and auditing, delegated co-operation44, procurement and evaluation45 . The simplifications
proposed by the present study concern: (i) reducing the disparity in project documents
formats across financing agencies; (ii) limiting the conditions for effectiveness of the loan
in order to limit delays at inception, (iii) harmonizing procurement and disbursement
procedures and monitoring and reporting systems; and (iv) training country project
managers, government officials and financial specialists on these procedures, early in the
project cycle.
43Again, the idea is not that donor staff, supposedly more skilled, train national staff, but on the contrary, that they both
learn from each other’s experience.
44I.e., when one donor acts on behalf of another.
45A specific task force has addressed these last two issues.52
136 Developing and applying result-based management tools at project, program as well
as country levels. Development results are defined as actual changes in the state of human
development at different scales of time and space that are attributable to a specific
intervention (Universalia and Baastel, 2004). The core principles of Result-Based
Management are: (1) a focus of performance measurement on development results; (2)
the strong articulation between several levels of objectives supported by different kinds of
stakeholders – MDGs, country development goals, development agencies strategies,
objectives defined at corporate, sector and project levels; (3) focus on client service and
stakeholder participation; (4) use of lessons learnt from performance information for
management decision-making, this becoming the responsibility of the project management
team; (5) the link between results, planning and allocation of resources. In itself the adoption
of such tools should be part of an in-depth reform of development agencies (as it is proposed
in the case of ADB – OPEV, 2000 and 2001) aiming at providing a coherent framework
for learning, transparency and accountability.
137 Enhancing evaluation systems through more systematic inclusion in evaluation reports
of information on the project experience with planning and implementation, and lessons
learned. The following information can be systematically reported: project management
by PMU or line department; composition of the PMU in terms of skills and origin of staff;
existence and composition of steering committee and efficiency of its intervention; planning
and implementing arrangements; roles of various actors; existence and effectiveness of
the M&E system; existence and effectiveness of participation at different stages of the
project cycle…
138 Reforming internal organization of development agencies: Five areas of change are
suggested:
 Distribution of roles: identify one corresponding staff member for each country and
each sector, who has good knowledge of the country; assist senior staff by providing
junior staff for repetitive tasks (such as procurement and disbursement control) and
for dissemination of project information, so that the senior staff member can concentrate
on more sensitive and tricky tasks (preparation and supervision).
 To effectively implement IWRM, IFIs, like governments, need to overcome their
current fragmentation.  Because of the way local people use water, single-use water
supply systems, for example domestic water or irrigation schemes, do not make sense.
IFIs will be in a better position to achieve the synergies inherent in the IWRM concept
if they can find a way to overcome this fragmentation, either through re-organizing
departments, or creating integrative mechanisms and developing shared projects.
 Dissemination and sharing of information on failures and successes and best practices
in project management inside and outside financing agencies: when it does not already
exist, build a database on projects accessible online for IFI staff and stakeholders at
country level.
 Strengthen the internal review process by giving more time to Task Managers to answer
comments.53
 Decentralization of project management to country offices or when this is not possible,
the use of corresponding local experts to interface with the Bank; the size of the
organizational structure, basically light, will depend on the volume of the Bank’s portfolio
in the country considered. This would improve the support provided to borrowers in
the preparation of the required documents, and the supervision by having a permanent
and close presence in the countries.
139 Helping governments take the lead on their own agricultural water development: As
strong leadership from the government is essential for the success of projects, investments in
preparing and improving strategic documents such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers,
supported by IFIs, should be continued. More focused strategic documents should also be
developed on food security and water and land resources management. These documents should
be fully owned by the country and not be a catalogue of recipes imposed by financing institutions.
Therefore, they need to be developed with the participation of all stakeholders at different levels
of constituency. Lessons can be drawn in this respect from recent experiences of decentralized
natural resource management in Africa (Ribot 2001). IFIs should respect these strategies and
ensure some continuity in funding to support them.
140 Regarding specifically the development of poverty reduction strategies, development
agencies should increase their technical, institutional and financial support to national actors
while letting them define their own objectives. Areas of support include preparation of
national rural development strategies; strengthening participatory processes and structures
to ensure the voice of the rural poor in the articulation of priority public actions; design of
socio-economic surveys on rural poverty; development of national, regional and local M&E
systems for rural development; and strengthening the institutional capacity of sectoral
ministries, academic institutions and NGOs in poverty diagnosis, participatory approaches,
monitoring, expenditure tracking and planning. This implies not only profound changes in
the type of relationships between IFIs and governments, but also reform of IFI internal
organization and activities; necessary engagement of rural development practitioners in the
country-driven PRSP process to ensure that the rural poor have a voice (not only staff of
the departments in charge of sector work and policy dialogue, but also task managers
involved in projects and evaluation department staff); improvement in the understanding
of rural poverty (see paragraph 125); and development of learning platforms ( see
paragraphs 131 and 138).
141 The shift from project-based assistance to sector programs and budget support can benefit
agricultural water development if it comprises specific support to strengthen agricultural
research and training institutions, and information and statistical systems. Considering the
inadequate resources of most countries in the region, a sub-regional approach is advisable,
for example by supporting institutions like ECOWAS and SADC.
142 The pooling of resources of several international development organizations with national
participation is encouraged as part of the broader reform of international technical
assistance, based on a better coordination among financing institutions. One output of this
movement could be the creation at country level of a central project office funded by various
development agencies with a multidisciplinary steering committee of experts, to prepare
and monitor projects and to participate in the preparation of strategic and policy papers.54
6 CONCLUSION
143 Recognizing that weaknesses in planning and implementation remain one of the main reasons
for the disappointing results of agricultural water development and management projects,
the objective of this component of the Collaborative Program was to identify ways to
increase the performance and sustainability of investments in agricultural water, through
practical measures to improve project preparation and implementation.
144 The approach adopted comprises a review of literature, a thorough analysis of a sample
of projects broadly representative of agricultural water development and management
experiences in sub-Saharan Africa, and interviews of staff from several development
agencies (including ADB, IFAD, AFD, FAO). Factors of successes and failures of projects
were then analyzed in relation with the project life cycle and the actors that are accountable
for them.
145 Figure 4 summarizes factors of success for general development projects. Our analysis
shows that in many instances, agricultural water development and management projects,
which rank among the most complex and unpredictable, do not fulfill these conditions, as
illustrated in Figure 5. Another lesson derived from this study is that responsibilities for
problems are shared among financing institutions and national governments of the concerned
countries. However the past modalities of development assistance, essentially based on a
combination of prescriptions and control, relied on unbalanced relationships between these
two main actors.
146 The study highlights that many determinants of success and failure are not specific to water
development issues but are linked to broader problems: general conception of development
assistance, internal organization of financing institutions, in-country factors (governance,
financial, legal and administrative institutions), rules and regulations of international trade…
All these factors can be summarized as a poor understanding of rural poverty and of
processes of change and innovation.
147 Present trends in financing institutions’ policies and procedures seek to address the
previously identified flaws of the planning and implementation process. IFIs’ capacities
have been strengthened in several sensitive domains, such as environmental, economic and
social studies. The new development assistance framework, based on a clearer focus on
poverty reduction (PRSPs), intensified policy dialogue between international financing
institutions and country partners, and new funding mechanisms (sector approach, budget
support) offers opportunities for better ownership of development objective and process
by governments. However, to be effective it will require a profound transformation in IFIs’
procedures and practices and government attitudes.
148 We have made two overarching recommendations. The first is that project management
should not be viewed as an “overhead” that is to be minimized, but an essential feature
of successful projects, with potentially huge pay-offs. It requires the deployment of
adequate human and financial resources and is applicable at financing institution as well
as government and partner level.55
Figure 4: Some factors of project success.
(Source: European Union, 2001)
Figure 5: Main weaknesses of P&I processes in agricultural water management projects.56
149 The second overarching recommendation is that projects should be explicitly designed
as “experiments” to learn lessons on how to improve P&I processes (Rondinelli, 1983),
feeding a knowledge base on planning and implementation of agricultural water projects
(costs, technical options, standards/norms, policies, inventory of expertise …), strengthening
the institutional memory of governments and financing institutions, and ultimately creating
an environment that encourages and enables increased and better quality investments.
150 Finally, the need for creating more synergies among financing institutions and governments
should be emphasized. This could be facilitated by NEPAD, which is supporting each of
the sub-regions to promote more and better investments in support of CAADP. This provides
an opportunity for effective IFI coordination.
151 Specific recommendations for agricultural water management projects are summarized in
Figure 6.
Figure 6: Specific recommendations for agricultural and water management projects.57
152 In the course of the study, some gaps in knowledge on P&I processes of agricultural water
development projects were identified. These include:
 A comprehensive assessment of irrigation management transfer experience in SSA,
with special attention to the role of private sector, would help guide future institutional
reforms.
 An analysis of existing training courses on agricultural water development in SSA, in
terms of project management, irrigation design, project design, economics of irrigation
at farm and local levels, social and institutional aspects of irrigation, environmental and
health impacts of irrigation, and empowerment would provide a basis for a
comprehensive program of capacity building. It should cover initial and continuing
education systems and different degree levels.
 A quantitative analysis of planning and implementation issues in relation with project
performance could be designed on the basis of the Cost study, and would help
prioritizing measures to improve P&I processes.5859
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